Prevention and Treatment of Recurrent Spontaneous Abortion Based on Donstitution Theory
As a common disease among women of childbearing age, Recurrent spontaneous abortion(RSA) has a complex etiology and is difficult to prevent and treat clinically. Based on the theory of Chinese medicine constitution, this paper finds that constitution is closely related to the occurrence and syndrome of the disease through the collation of relevant literature, and the patients with the disease often see the constitution of qi deficiency, yang deficiency, qi stagnation and other combined constitution. It also puts forward that clinical attention should be paid to the liver, spleen and kidney, and good results can be achieved by regulating the constitution through drugs, acupuncture and moxibustion, diet and exercise.
Russian President Vladimir Putin chairs a meeting with members of the Russian government via teleconference in Moscow on March 10, 2022. (Mikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images)
How we did this
As a new Pew Research Center survey highlights, Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, continue to be viewed negatively by people around the world. A median of 82% of adults across 24 countries have an unfavorable view of Russia, while a similar share havenoconfidence in Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs, including nine-in-ten or more in Poland, Sweden, Spain, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Netherlands, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Ratings for the country and its leader plummeted in many nations followingRussia’s invasion of Ukrainein February 2022, and they are at all-time lows in several countries in this year’s survey.
In contrast to Putin, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is seen more positively. While a median of just 11% express confidence in the Russian leader, 51% say this of Zelenskyy. But opinions of Zelenskyy vary by country and fewer than half have confidence in his leadership in 10 nations, including NATO members Hungary, Greece and Italy.
NATO, which hascontributed weapons and trainingto Ukraine since the February 2022 invasion, is seen favorably by 11 member states included in the survey. NATO has been consistentlyviewed more favorablythan notin recent years, and views have grown slightly more positive in Greece and Poland since 2022. However, negative opinion of NATO has crept upward in Hungary and the U.S. While about six-in-ten Americans continue to express a favorable view of NATO, there is a large partisan difference on this question: 76% of Democrats see the alliance positively, compared with 49% of Republicans.
In 11 European countries surveyed, as well as India – where Russian oil access is a relevant issue – people were asked if being tough with Russia on Ukraine or maintaining access to Russia’s oil and gas reserves is more important to bilateral relations. Across these countries, a median of 66% say it is more important to be tough with Russia, while 29% say it is more important to maintain access to Russia’s energy reserves. People in Hungary, India and Greece are the most likely to want to maintain access to Russia’s oil and gas reserves, while Swedes and Poles are the most likely to want to be tough on Russia.
In several ways, publics in Greece, Hungary and India are outliers when it comes to views about Russia and Putin. Greeks and Hungarians stand out relative to European counterparts as being more favorable on Russia, confident in Putin and negative toward Zelenskyy. Hungary, in particular, hasfaced criticismfor delays in sanctioning Russia, while public sentiments in Greece have tended tofavor remaining neutralin the conflict. India (which hasabstainedfrom condemning the Russian invasion) is the only country where a majority expresses a favorable view of Russia and confidence in Putin.
These findings come from a new Pew Research Center survey conducted from Feb. 20 to May 22, 2023, among 30,861 people in 24 countries. Below are some of the other findings regarding views of Russia and NATO, attitudes toward Russian energy and confidence in Putin, Zelenskyy and key NATO leaders.
Ratings of Russia and Putin in middle-income nations
The survey includes eightmiddle-income nationsthat Pew Research Center has not surveyed since 2019 due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic andsubsequent difficultiesin conducting face-to-face interviews across the world. Opinions toward Russia and Putin are on balance negative in these countries, although India and Indonesia are exceptions. Negative sentiment toward Russia and Putin has increased by double digits in nearly every middle-income country since 2019. For instance, 74% now express a negative view of Putin in Argentina, up from 51% four years ago.
Confidence in Zelenskyy
A median of 51% across the 24 countries surveyed express confidence in Zelenskyy’s leadership, while 39% hold the opposite view. Confidence in Zelenskyy ranges from 86% in Sweden to just 11% in Hungary. Besides Hungary, half or more do not have confidence in the Ukrainian leader in Greece, Mexico, Italy, Israel, Brazil and Argentina. Age is linked to these views: Younger adults (those ages 18 to 39) are more likely to express a lack of confidence in Zelenskyy than adults 40 and older in several countries.
Views of NATO
Positive opinion of NATO in the 11 member states polled ranges from 93% in Poland to 40% in Greece. And in Sweden, which iscurrently in negotiationsto join NATO, 78% have a positive view of the alliance. Among these countries, NATO favorability has been largely stable, historically, and particularly high in the aftermath of the Russian invasion. Greeks, who tend to have morenegative views of NATOcompared with other countries surveyed in recent years, have grown more favorable since 2022, as have Poles. However, positive sentiment has declined in both the U.S. and Hungary.
Those who place themselves on the ideological right in several European countries are more likely to express a positive view of the alliance than those on the left. However, in the U.S. and Canada, this pattern is reversed: Those on theleftare more likely to say they have a favorable opinion of NATO.
Confidence in Biden, Macron and Scholz
On balance, confidence in Zelenskyy largely aligns with views of U.S. President Joe Biden, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. A median of 54% have confidence in Biden on the world stage, 50% have confidence in Macron and 49% say the same of Scholz.
While Biden is largely viewed with confidence across the world, support is weaker among some NATO allies, such as Hungary and Italy. For more on international views of Biden, see “International Views of Biden and U.S. Largely Positive.” While medians of 50% and 49% have confidence in Macron and Scholz, respectively, support of both leaders has declined in many countries since 2022, particularly among NATO allies.
Road map to the report
The chapters that follow discuss these findings and others in more detail:
Chapter 5 looks at overallopinion of NATOamong member nations and Sweden.
Chapter 6 examinesconfidence in Putin and Zelenskyy, paired with views of U.S. President Joe Biden, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.
Over the course of the country's invasion of Ukraine, beliefs about who is a friend and who is a foe of Russia have consolidated among its population. There is one surprising exception, however - Ukraine itself. A survey among Russians shows that the country slid down in the ranking from the second biggest enemy of Russia in 2021 to its fifth biggest foe in 2023. While previously, 40 percent of Russian had named the country as an enemy, only 26 percent listed it most recently when asked what Russia's five biggest enemies were.
According to the reoccurring survey by the Levada Center, a Russian non-governmental organization, official Russian positions on its friends and enemies are generally echoed by its people. Especially allies of Ukraine are seen increasingly negative in Russia. The most disliked among them as of May 2023 were the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Poland. 72 percent of Russians currently consider the U.S. an enemy - up 8 percentage points from two years ago. Dislike of the latter three countries rose significantly faster, by between 21 and 32 percentage points - with the biggest increase hitting Russia's former ally Germany.
The opposite picture emerges concerning the country's biggest allies. Belarus, China and India gained between 18 and 20 percentage points in the ranking in two years, while Kazakhstan - having spoken out against the Ukraine war - lost some approval.
Yet, it isn't always a majority who shares these beliefs. With Belarus and the U.S., a large majority of respondents considers the countries among the top 5 of friends and enemies of Russia, respectively. Concerning the country's perceived as its second biggest friend and enemy, China and the United Kingdom, only small majorities of 58 percent and 51 percent could agree to place them among the countries major friends and foes.
80% родителей школьников выступают против исключения английского языка из школьной программы. К обязательному изучению китайского общественность тоже относится настороженно: 59% против. В опросе сервиса по поиску высокооплачиваемой работы SuperJob приняли участие 1600 родителей школьников из всех округов страны.
Депутат Госдумы РФ Султан Хамзаев предложил исключить английский язык из перечня обязательных предметов в школе. По его мнению, это позволит уйти от прозападного вектора в российской системе образования.Инициативу одобряет лишь 9% родителей школьников, тогда как 8 из 10 выступают против такого решения. В комментариях респонденты напоминают, что английский остается языком международного общения, а методика его преподавания отработана годами.
Следует ли сделать китайский язык обязательным для изучения? Общество относится к этой идее осторожно: 6 из 10 опрошенных (59%) против такого нововведения. В числе их аргументов — сложность китайского языка, неуверенность в состоятельности отечественных методик его преподавания, а также отсутствие массовой потребности: «Все инженерные специальности по-прежнему требуют знания английского». Сторонником изучения китайского языка в системе среднего образования выступают только 19%. С их точки зрения, стратегическое партнерство России с КНР обязательно приведет к востребованности специалистов, владеющих китайским. Место проведения опроса: Россия, все округа Населенных пунктов: 349 Время проведения: 20—27 апреля 2022 года Исследуемая совокупность: родители школьников Размер выборки: 1600 респондентов
Actually, it’s the other way around. Austrians are Slavs who are speaking a Germanic languague.
Genetics don’t lie:
Austrian genetic ancestry is virtually industinguishable from Czech or Slovak and more similar to Polish ancestry than German
Slavs originate in the east, in the Russian and Ukrainian steppe most likely and migrated westwards in the 6th and 7th centuries C.E., settling an area from eastern Germany, Austria, most of Balkans and everything to the east from that. Some tribes were soon conquered by their more advanced neighbors, Bavarians took over what are now Austria and Slovenia, Hungarians took over what is now Hungary, which caused the weird geographical split between south Slavs and the rest.
In Romania, Slavic settlers were likely assimilated into the local culture, in modern Austria and Hungary the two populations mixed and adopted German and Hungarian languague respectively, in Czechia, Slovakia and Slovenia the old slavic languague contined to dominate. Population mixing still occured, but the slavic languague won out in these three.
As to why the culture is similar to that of Austria, ask the Habsburgs. [генетика не врёт, потому что молчит? вопрос не к ней, но ответ налит сэ]
Итог: решение танского императора дать тюркскому дворянину более высокий статус ведёт к упадку династии Тан, что ведёт к возвышению монголов, которые объединяют Россию под началом Москвы, вытесняют иранские языки из Центральной Азии, вытесняют тюркские племена в Малую Азию, что приводит к османскому запрету на европейскую торговлю в восточном направлении, что приводит к испанским кораблям, направляющимся на Запад, что приводит к европейской колонизации Америки и в конечном итоге к возникновению Соединённых Штатов.
Philipp M. Lersch studies the relationship between people’s number of siblings and their economic wealth in Germany. He finds that additional siblings reduce wealth by about 38%. Parental wealth moderates the association so that sibship size is more negatively associated with filial wealth when parents are wealthier.
Introduction
How does people’s number of siblings affect their wealth, including the total amount of their material possessions such as savings, real estate and cash, less any debts and loans? As wealth shapes people’s life chances and opportunities, it is important to address this question to gain a better understanding of how the family of origin influences people’s life chances (Killewald, Pfeffer and Schachner 2017).
In a recent paper, I show that additional siblings reduce wealth by about 38% in Germany (Lersch 2019). Parental wealth moderates the association so that sibship size is more negatively associated with filial wealth when parents are wealthier. These results are obtained by utilizing high-quality data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) for the years 2002, 2007 and 2012, which allow to directly link parents and their adult children living in separate households and to measure the wealth of both generations. I include 6,388 (partly repeated) observations from 3,502 individuals nested in 2,628 families, where I focus on the filial generation and include all respondents whose parents are observed in the SOEP at least once since 1984. Children are observed between ages 18 and 59 with a median age of 33, and mothers are 27 years older on average. Missing values are multiply imputed. The code for the analysis can be found here.
Siblings’ wealth a consequence of resource dilution?
Parents’ wealth is directly linked to adult children’s wealth because it can be transmitted to the next generation through inter vivos transfers and inheritance (Keister 2003). Parental wealth is also indirectly linked to children’s wealth, as it influences their education and cognitive development (for instance, through private schooling, tutoring, expensive free time activities) which subsequently determine their adult income and their capacity to accumulate wealth.
From a resource dilution-perspective these relationships are highly dependent on the number of siblings in the family: the greater the number of siblings in the family, the more thinly parental resources are spread between them (Blake 1989: 10ff). In other words, parents have less wealth to give to each sibling and to support their children’s development and education. This should result in less wealth among people with more siblings. Indeed, previous studies examining the number of siblings and wealth in the United States and Australia, generally find negative associations (Keister 2003, 2004; Parr 2006). However, most of these studies do not directly control for parental wealth and other parental characteristics such as risk preferences, which may simultaneously affect fertility and filial wealth.
Furthermore, these studies neglect important heterogeneity in the association between people’s number of siblings and their wealth. First, resource dilution may be non-linear. For instance, for a family with two children, parental resources that can be invested into each child are halved with respect to a one-child family, but in a family with three children, one-third of parental resources may be invested in each one. A nonlinear pattern may also arise because some positive consequences of having siblings (such as mutual support and socialization) may counterbalance the negative consequences of sharing some resources with them. Finally, the consequences of growing up with more siblings may depend on the wealth of parents; having more siblings may be more “harmful” in rich families because wealth is available and can be diluted, while for poor families without wealth dilution is inconsequential.
Results
Overall, my results confirm previous findings about the negative relationship between number of siblings and personal wealth. Figure 1 shows how net wealth decreases with each additional sibling up to three. The relationship seems largely linear. People with one sibling have about 6.00 points of wealth on the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformed scale (similar to a log-transformation), which is statistically not significantly different from only children. Those with two siblings have significantly less wealth than only children, but have similar wealth compared to those with one sibling. Those with three siblings have about 4.09 points of net wealth. The differences by sibship size then taper off and those with four or five siblings do not have less wealth than those with three siblings. However, only about 10% of individuals have more than three siblings. Once additional control variables (including parental risk preferences and whether parents have died) are considered in a multivariable model, the estimated effect for number of siblings indicates that each additional sibling reduces wealth by about 38%. To put this in perspective by comparing effect sizes of number of siblings and age, everything else equal, individuals need to accumulate wealth for about two more years, based on the current data, to offset the disadvantage of having an additional sibling.
The amount of wealth that can be transmitted from the parental generation to each child depends not only on the number of siblings but also on the overall parental wealth, and the number of siblings is more negatively associated with filial wealth when parents are wealthier. Figure 2 shows that children with richer parents have more wealth—where wealth in the parental and filial generation is measured concurrently—, but this effect decreases with the number of siblings and is most pronounced for the upper part of the wealth distribution. This means that the greater the parental wealth, the greater the dilution. In contrast, for individuals whose parents belong to the bottom 10% of the parental wealth distribution, the number of siblings does not further dilute parental wealth. This may be explained by “floor effects” (Bernardi and Radl 2014: 1657) at the lower end of the wealth distribution, because only in families with sufficient surplus resources such as parental wealth, can these resources be diluted.
Implications
My findings underline the important role of the family of origin and more particularly of the number of siblings for wealth attainment. The results suggest that fertility in the family of origin has a systematic impact on wealth attainment and may contribute to population-level wealth inequalities independently of other socio-economic characteristics such as parental wealth. At the same time, the association between number of siblings and wealth is shaped by parental wealth in Germany, where additional siblings are more adverse for wealth attainment when parents are wealthier. It is also noteworthy that fertility itself may be affected by parental wealth, and this may also shape the intergenerational transmission of wealth inequality.
The relevance of fertility in the family of origin may increase in the coming years because, for several years now, the unprecedented wealth accumulated during the economic prosperous post-war period in many Western European countries including Germany has been transferred to the following generations (Bach and Thiemann 2016), and this is not yet fully captured in the current data. In this context of large direct transfers, for which dilution is most likely, the association between sibship size and wealth may become more critical.
References
Bach, S., Thiemann, A. (2016). Inheritance tax revenue low despite surge in inheritances. DIW Economic Bulletin 4/5 2016. Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
Bernardi, F., & Radl, J. (2014). The long-term consequences of parental divorce for children’s educational attainment. Demographic Research, 30, 1653–1680.
Blake, Judith. 1989. Family Size and Achievement, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Keister, Lisa A. 2003. “Sharing the wealth. The effect of siblings on adults’ wealth ownership.” Demography 40:521–542.
Keister, Lisa A.. 2004. “Race, Family Structure, and Wealth. The Effect of Childhood Family on Adult Asset Ownership.” Sociological Perspectives 47:161–187.
Killewald, Alexandra, Fabian T. Pfeffer, and Jared N. Schachner. 2017. “Wealth Inequality and Accumulation.” Annual Review of Sociology 43:379–404.
Lersch, Philipp M. 2019. “Fewer Siblings, More Wealth? Sibship Size and Wealth Attainment.” European Journal of Population 35:959–986.
Parr, Nick. 2006. “Do children from small families do better?” Journal of Population Research 23:1–25
Странно, как то даже не в Германии (More siblings, less wealth) это кажется очевидным
на улицах беларуских городов фашистский чаушенковский ОМОН лупцует женщин, в том числе. Кроме Польши и Литвы (соседи) никто больше (из евриков) беларуский протест не поддержал. Не поддержали они и Украину.
И это не удивляет.
Если бы после второй мировой войны не американская оккупация, нацизм в Германии и (имхо) везде в Европе возродился бы. Такшта, брекзит не удивляет. Не удивляет и неучастие Швейцарии в ООН и прочих наднациональных конторах.
Имхо: это происходит не потому, что они боятся Путина и Россию, а потому что Путин и Россия им внутренне понятнее, чем США. США организована беглецрми из Европы, и это не стоит забывать, это во всём и в генах и в оргструктуре, Они выбрали речь посполитую, а евра выбрала власть королей и генсеков.
Сегодня были усилены ограничения по детям и старикам (65+).
Провёл вчера и сегодня наблюдения в лесопарке Тропарёво, недалеко от гостиницы Турист, что вдоль Ленинского проспекта от Лобачевского до Комиссаров. Сидел на лавочке и считал прохожих около 3х/4х часов.
Вчера насчитал 65 жителей, сегодня 78 человек, то-есть, больше на 1/5. Можно уверенно сказать, что на призывы правительства охранять здоровье, население положило с прибором, такое заединство.
While many people turn on the radio for some easy listening on the side, for example, while working or driving, avid music listeners often complain about radio stations playing the same songs over and over again. But is that a fair criticism?
According to data recently released by Nielsen, there may be a bit of truth to it. Looking at the top 10 radio songs of the past decade in the United States, most of the songs are awfully familiar. The fact that the newest song in a ranking spanning the years 2010 through 2019 is from 2005 is also a damning indictment of radio stations’ tendency to rely on material that is tried and trusted rather than playing the latest hits.
The numbers behind the ranking are quite impressive though. With a total airplay audience of more than 11 billion over the past decade, “Every Breath You Take” by The Police was the most listened to song on U.S. radio between 2010 and 2019. Theoretically, that means that every American, no matter the age, listened to that particular song 35 times during that period.
Того и гляди, захватят и заставят эту х.йню слушать вместо пионерской зорки
There are many ordinary things available in Russia that are forbidden / illegal in the US. Things like fireworks and patent medicines. Too many to enumerate, really, but one thing stands out - super low-quality cigarettes. Russians now have fancy Western cigarettes but many down and out people still smoke the classic ‘made for bums’ Russian cigarette - the Belomorkanal (Беломорканал) or simply ‘Belomorka’ [по-моему, просто Беломор, но нет даже слова папиросы, в идише и немецком? есть]. These lung-furnace sticks are wrapped in some kind of papyrus or newspaper and stuffed with God knows what and a pinch of 50-year-old tobacco. Named after the famous White Sea Canal where everyone died to build it, these death sticks keep up the Russian tradition of taunting death on a daily basis. Of course, such trash-in-a-wrapper could never be sold in the US, but here it is the comfort of those Russian patriots who need a smoke and can’t afford the real thing.
On both sides of the Atlantic, pub owners, marching bands, bagpipers and revellers are gearing up to celebrate St. Patrick's Day which falls on Sunday. These days, the Irish holiday is also a big deal for the Irish diaspora in many countries around the world, particularly in the United States where many people have Irish ancestry. It's often said that the first ever St. Patrick's Day parade was held in New York City in 1763 by Irish soldiers serving in the British army. More recent research claims the first ever parade actually occurred in 1601 in Augustine, Florida. By contrast, Ireland's first state-sponsored parade was held in Dublin in 1931. [Москва выпала, но тут тоже бывало, включая парады — как теперь, не знаю]
The celebrations have been criticized in recent years for being too commercialized and given that an estimated 13 million pints of Guinness are consumed on March 17th every year (enough to fill two and a half Olympic-sized swimming pools), that is somewhat understandable. The following infographic shows some key facts and spending trends behind St. Patrick's Day, particularly in the United States. Chicago is one of the best places to celebrate and its festivities kick off at noon on Saturday. The city is notable for dying the river green, a tradition that began in 1962 and involves 40 lbs of dye. The green color lasts about five hours.
The event is still hugely popular with young Americans and according to the National Retail Federation, 72 percent of those aged 18-34 plan to celebrate this year. Total U.S. spending is expected to reach $5.6 billion in 2019, a slight decrease on $5.9 billion last year with average spending expected to be just over $40. Boston is another great city for St. Patrick's Day festivities and it claims the title as the most Irish city in the country with 20.4 percent of its population reporting Irish ancestry. Given the extent of its connections with Ireland, it throws an impressive parade every year and it the South Boston Parade starts in "Southie" at 1pm on Sunday.
Female life expectancy is higher than that of males, and this gender gap is largest in Eastern Europe. Sergi Trias-Llimós and Fanny Janssen show that alcohol-attributable mortality explained more than 15% of this gap in eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in 2012, and describe how the situation has evolved over time. Their results suggest that effectively tackling alcohol abuse among young men in these countries would help to reduce the gender gap in life expectancy.
Gender gaps in Central and Eastern Europe
Throughout the world, women’s life expectancy is higher than that of men. The world average is currently 73.2 years for women vs. 68.6 years for men, with a mean gender gap of 4.6 years (UN Online 2017). This gap has been traditionally wide in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where it is currently the largest in the world: women’s life expectancy is 9.8 years higher than men’s in the Eastern European region, and the gap is even wider in countries such as Russia (11.3 years), Ukraine (10.0) and Belarus (11.1) (UN Online 2017).
Part of the gender gap in life expectancy can be explained by biological factors (e.g. genetics, hormones, etc.; Luy et al. 2015). However, most of the gap is due to non-biological factors and notably to behavioural factors, such as smoking and alcohol, that result in diseases such as lung cancer (smoking), liver cirhosis (alcohol), and cardiovascular diseases (smoking and alcohol). In Eastern Europe, such factors are thought to play an even bigger role than in other developed countries (Luy et al. 2015). In particular, a remarkably important behavioural difference between Eastern European men and women is alcohol consumption (WHO 2018), with the former, especially at working ages, drinking substantially more than the latter, and indulging in riskier drinking patterns (higher consumption of alcohol per occasion; Popova et al. 2007).
In a recent study (Trias-Llimós and Janssen 2018), we formally examined the role of alcohol in gender differences in life expectancy over time in eight CEE countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.We did so by estimating the impact of gender differences in alcohol-attributable mortality by summing – for each sex – the deaths from causes both totally attributable to alcohol (using cause-specific mortality data from the Human Cause of Death Database) and partly attributable to alcohol (using information from the Global Burden of Disease Study on alcohol consumption and on the role of alcohol in causes of death partly attributable to alcohol).
Whereas the full paper distinguishes between these two separate groups of alcohol-attributable deaths, in this article we will simplify matters, and directly show the impact of all alcohol-attributable deaths combined on gender differences in life expectancy in the eight CEE countries for the period 1990-2014.
Contribution of alcohol to gender gaps in life expectancy
In 2012, the average gender gap in life expectancy at birth in the eight CEE countries was 9.6 years. Gender differences in alcohol-attributable mortality, were, on average, responsible for 1.7 years (17.9%) of this gap. Overall, the contribution of alcohol to the gender gap ranged from 1.4 years in Poland and Romania to 2.4 years in Lithuania. In all eight countries, its contribution exceeded 15%, with Lithuania having the highest relative contribution (21.5%), and Ukraine the lowest (15.1%). (Table 1)
Time trends
In addition to levels, it is worth considering the time trend. Figure 1 shows trends in the gender gap in life expectancy over time (1990 onwards) for the eight selected CEE countries.
In most of these countries, and especially in Russia and Ukraine, life expectancies and the associated gender gaps have followed irregular time-trends, with large increases in the early 1990s followed by declines in the late 1990s, and a renewed increase until around 2005. The contribution of alcohol-attributable mortality to the gender gaps in life expectancy has also followed an irregular pattern, with an upward tendency, especially in Russia, Lithuania and Ukraine, until 2005.
From around 2005 onwards, the contribution of alcohol-attributable mortality to the gender gap in life expectancy declined in all countries, except in Moldova. Over the period 1990-2012, it contributed 1.9 years on average (18.8%).
Explanation
Overall, our results suggest that the large gender gap in life expectancy in CEE countries is directly linked to gender differences in alcohol consumption, and especially to the substantially higher consumption of vodka and other spirits and to the higher prevalence of binge drinking among working-age Eastern European men as compared to women (WHO 2018; Popova et al. 2007). These behaviours could be explained by traditional gender differences in social roles (e.g., women being responsible for housework inside the home, and men for generating an income outside the home), and their differing strategies for coping with stress (men tend to drink more alcohol to deal with stressful situations; Bobrova et al. 2010).
The changes over time in the contribution of alcohol to gender differences in life expectancy (increase up until 2005, decline thereafter) can be predominantly linked to changes in alcohol prevention policies. In the 1990s, such measures were rare, especially in the former Soviet countries. The limited policies in place had little effect on the dynamics of alcohol-attributable mortality, which was increasing at that time in response to the unfavourable economic, political and public health context. However, from mid-2000s onwards, stricter preventive health policies targeting alcohol abuse were implemented, including controls on the production and sale of alcohol in Russia, and increased alcohol taxes in the Baltic republics, for example (Jasilionis et al. 2011; Grigoriev et al. 2015). The adoption of these policies, which occurred in a more favourable economic and political context, can be linked to positive changes and to gradual and sustained declines in overall alcohol consumption in CEE countries (WHO 2018; Moskalewicz et al. 2016; Grigoriev et al. 2015).
Conclusion
To sum up, the gender gaps in life expectancy in most CEE countries are among the largest in the world. Gender differences in alcohol consumption and in the resulting alcohol-attributable mortality have been shown to make a major contribution to the gender gaps in life expectancy in Eastern Europe. In 2012, the contribution of alcohol to this gender gap exceeded 15% in all eight CEE countries, due mainly to both higher alcohol consumption and riskier drinking patterns (consumption of alcohol per occasion) among working-aged men than among women. In general, the contribution of alcohol increased until 2005 and declined thereafter, mainly following the implementation of stronger preventive policies after 2005.
It is precisely these preventive policies that should be pursued and reinforced, especially among working-aged men, if further mortality reductions in CEE countries are to be achieved.
Это неправда. Анализ генома не может выявить этническую принадлежность.
Светлана Боринская, генетик:
Национальность (или этническая принадлежность) не пришита к генам, это явление не биологическое, а культурное. Времена, когда считали, что этнос имеет биологическую природу, ушли в прошлое [как бы не таг, УЕФА, имхо, щетает по другому]. Этничность, так же как и язык, не является врожденным признаком — ее обретают (или не обретают) в общении с другими людьми. Миф о том, что «кровь» или гены определяют национальность (или любые другие формируемые под влиянием культуры признаки), очень опасен [это нацизм, какбе побеждённый в 45 году]. Его не раз использовали для манипуляций общественным сознанием, последствия которых варьировались от разной глубины дискриминации до геноцида.
Семья влияет на то, к какой этнической группе (или группам, если родители имеют разную этническую принадлежность) отнесет себя человек. И разумеется, от родителей каждый получает не только язык и воспитание, но и гены. То, какие родительские гены достанутся ребенку, определяется при слиянии сперматозоида и яйцеклетки. Именно в этот момент формируется геном индивида — совокупность всей наследственной информации, которая во взаимодействии со средой определяет дальнейшее развитие организма.
Процессы изоляции отдельных групп, перемежающиеся миграциями и смешением народов, оставляют генетические «следы». Если число браков внутри группы превышает приток генов извне, то в такой группе накапливаются варианты генов, по спектру и частоте встречаемости отличающие ее от соседей.
Такие отличия выявлены при изучении групп населения, проживающих в разных регионах мира и имеющих разную этническую принадлежность. Поэтому анализ генома может показать, к какой группе относятся родственники и предки человека — в том случае, если эти более или менее отдаленные родственники уже были изучены популяционными генетиками и если при исследовании они указали свою этническую принадлежность. Но этот анализ не указывает национальность или этническую принадлежность самого владельца анализируемого генома — эта национальность может быть той же самой, что и у его родственников (особенно если это близкие родственники), но может быть и совершенно иной. постнаука пишет о 5 мифах, а 6й, что рацио оборет миф даже не упоминается, а он есть :(
Экономисты
сравнили зарплаты в долларах в России, странах СНГ и Восточной Европы, а
также Китае и Бразилии в терминах паритета покупательной способности
валют (ППС, уравнивает покупательные способности валют разных стран).
При расчетах авторы использовали данные Всемирного банка о ППС 2011
года, а также курс валют и уровень инфляции в рассматриваемых странах в
последующие годы. Российский уровень оплаты труда остается выше
большинства стран СНГ — в 2017 году ее среднемесячный размер составил
$1640 по ППС, оценили в ВШЭ. Единственным государством СНГ, обогнавшим
Россию, стала Белоруссия, где средняя зарплата по ППС в прошлом году
достигла $1648 (не мудрено, что тут все ахирели, ибо в 3+ раза больше, чем не ППС).
Конкуренция с Минском
В 2011–2014 годах
Россия еще стабильно обгоняла Белоруссию по уровню зарплат, видно из
расчетов ВШЭ. Но постепенно отрыв сокращался: так, в 2011 году он
составлял $338, а в 2014-м — $95. По итогам 2015 года (первого после
девальвации рубля) Белоруссия вырвалась вперед: средняя зарплата по ППС в
ней составила $1556, а в России — $1530. Хотя в 2016 году Россия вновь
вернула свои позиции ($1561 против $1517), годом позже Белоруссия опять
опередила ее, хотя и незначительно — разрыв в $8 стал минимальным за
рассматриваемый период (деноминация в Белоруссии в 2016 году учтена в
расчетах).
Как отметил в беседе с РБК научный сотрудник
Белорусского экономического исследовательско-образовательного центра
(BEROC) Дмитрий Крук, в 2017 году в Белоруссии действительно был
зафиксирован рост реальных зарплат, хоть и не радикальный (по данным
Белстата, он составил 7,5% к предыдущему году). «Пик реальных зарплат
пришелся на середину 2014 года, потом они снижались на протяжении трех
лет, пока не возобновили [рост] в прошлом году, примерно со второго
квартала», — сказал эксперт, отметив, что динамика зарплат по ППС имеет
свои особенности и может отличаться.
Ситуация в России
В
2015 году реальная начисленная заработная плата в России сократилась на
9% по отношению к предыдущему году, напоминают эксперты ВШЭ, ссылаясь на
Росстат. В последующие годы она росла небольшими темпами: прирост
составил +0,8% в 2016 году и +2,9% в 2017 году. Рост номинальных
показателей в эти годы составил 5,1, 7,9 и 6,7% соответственно. При этом
девальвация рубля в 2014–2015 годах привела к сокращению оплаты труда в
России в долларовом выражении, отмечают экономисты.
Минэкономразвития
ожидает замедления темпов роста реальных зарплат с планируемых 6,3% в
2018 году до 0,8% в 2019 году. Как следует из прогноза министерства
(pdf), в первую очередь это связано с высокой базой 2018 года, так как
зарплаты работников социальной сферы (они попали под майские указы 2012
года) довели до целевого уровня, а МРОТ повысили до прожиточного
минимума. Другими причинами могут стать ускорение инфляции и изменение
сроков индексации зарплат бюджетников (с 1 октября 2019 года вместо 1
января, как в этом году). В 2020 году зарплаты вырастут на 1,5%, в
2021-м — на 2,3%, а в следующие три года — на 2,8% ежегодно,
прогнозирует Минэкономразвития.
Наиболее близкими к России по
уровню среднемесячной зарплаты странами являются Казахстан и
Азербайджан: в 2017 году оплата труда там составила 76% от российского
показателя ($1252 по ППС). В целом во всех странах СНГ, кроме
Белоруссии, сопоставимые зарплаты ниже, чем в России. На Украине, ранее
решившей выйти из СНГ, средняя зарплата по ППС также стабильно ниже
российских показателей. В 2017 году она составила $1074 (65% от
российской).
Восточная Европа и БРИКС
Среди государств
Восточной Европы Россия уступает в показателях оплаты труда по ППС таким
странам, как Польша ($2343), Чехия ($2026), Хорватия ($1950) и Венгрия
($2107), следует из мониторинга. Болгария и Румыния от России по уровню
зарплат отстают, однако в последние годы разница в зарплатах в России и
этих странах стремительно сокращается, отмечают эксперты.
Что
касается двух рассмотренных в мониторинге партнеров по БРИКС, то их по
уровню зарплат Россия опережает. В Китае при номинальном обменном курсе
валют зарплаты превышают российские, но при переходе к расчетам по ППС
Россия сохраняет более высокий показатель, отмечают эксперты ВШЭ. Так, в
2016 году (сопоставимых данных за 2017 год по Китаю пока нет) средняя
зарплата в Китае составляла $1461, а в России — $1561. Но разрыв также
сокращается: в 2011 году он составлял более $450, а в 2016-м — $100. В
Бразилии средняя зарплата в прошлом году достигла только $1407 — ее
уровень оплата труда в России превышает стабильно.
Как раз щаз в Минске: беларусы оч удивились, мяхка выражаясъ
меня касается, потому что часто езжу
сначала вводили, потому что в Минске проводили ЧМ по шайбе и по футболу (что-то молодёжное), потом потому что РБ ввела безвизовый режим,
судя по всему (см ниже) отказываться не будет — что ни говори: Европа, таки, и традиции евриков жывут
Александр Лукашенко считает, что россияне «сами не понимают, чего хотят и что они делают на белорусско-российской границе». Россия создала пограничные зоны в трех граничащих с Белоруссией областях еще в прошлом году
Президент Белоруссии
Александр Лукашенко предложил России определиться с форматом присутствия
пограничников на границе двух стран. Об этом он заявил во время
посещения пограничной заставы «Дивин» в Кобринском районе Белоруссии,
сообщает БелТА.
По словам Лукашенко, белорусским пограничникам
«нельзя уподобляться россиянам», так как «они сами не понимают, чего
хотят и что они делают на белорусско-российской границе». «Пусть
определяются. Определятся — нам не проблема ответить. Мы готовы в любой
момент адекватно дать ответ. Если они хотят закрыть границу —
пожалуйста. Закроют — мы в ответ также должны ввести контроль на
границе», — подчеркнул президент Белоруссии.
Он добавил, что
считает границы «пережитком прошлого», который не приносит много пользы
для общения людей. «Мы должны видеть, что они хотят. Мы знаем, где они
навыводили свои войска, создали комендатуры и прочую инфраструктуру», —
отметил глава государства. Вопрос охраны границы будет обсуждаться во
время предстоящего в июне Высшего госсовета Союзного государства,
добавил он.
В
Госпогранкомитете Белоруссии БелТА сообщили, что с российской стороны
на общей границе присутствуют штатные подразделения пограничной службы
ФСБ, которые «фактически несут охрану госграницы». У Белоруссии
постоянно дислоцирующихся подразделений органов погранслужбы на
восточном направлении нет. В то же время, когда поступают данные о
нарушениях, пограничники могут выдвигаться на местность, в том числе
взаимодействуя с органами внутренних дел и территориальных подразделений
органов госбезопасности.
Приказы директора ФСБ о создании пограничных зон были изданы еще в феврале прошлого года. Посол России в
Белоруссии Александр Суриков тогда говорил, что создание пограничной
зоны вызвано необходимостью контроля за пересечением границы гражданами
третьих стран, а для россиян и белорусов ничего не изменится.