Showing posts with label Италия. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Италия. Show all posts

Monday, February 10, 2025

ricetta perfetta

Итальянские учёные разработали идеальный рецепт приготовления яиц


Группа итальянских физиков представила в журнале Communications Engineering метод варки яиц, который придаёт им лучшую структуру и сохраняет больше питательных веществ. Суть метода — попеременное погружение яйца в кипящую и чуть тёплую воду.

Дело в том, что белок и желток требуют разной температуры для оптимального приготовления — около 85 градусов для белка и 65 для желтка. Простое приготовление при температуре 100 градусов может сделать желток совершенно твёрдым, а если поместить яйца в водяную баню при температуре 60-70 градусов, часто оказывается недостаточно нагретым белок.

Исследователи рассчитали теплопроводность в яйце и смоделировали процесс с помощью механики жидкостей. Их новый рецепт: вместо того чтобы держать яйцо в воде при постоянной температуре, надо чередовать воду около 100 градусов и около 30 градусов (две минуты в одной ёмкости, а затем две минуты в другой). Общая продолжительность процесса составляет 32 минуты. Под воздействием высоких температур яичные белки становятся достаточно твердыми, а желток остаётся нагретым до около 67 градусов, что хорошо для кремовой консистенции

«Этот особый термический профиль позволяет оптимально приготовить яйцо во всех его частях», — резюмирует команда Пеллегрино Мусто из Национального исследовательского совета в Поццуоли.

@BILD_Russia

Ребята делом заняты, но рецепт не идеальный

Tuesday, June 13, 2023

Is Italy about to disappear?

June 12, 2023 Gianpiero Dalla Zuanna and Marcantonio Caltabiano

The future of the Italian population depends in large part on migration. Marcantonio Caltabiano and Gianpiero Dalla-Zuanna compare the most recent forecasts of net migration for Italy proposed by Eurostat, ISTAT and the Population Division of the United Nations. Depending on assumptions, the virtually inevitable demographic decline of Italy may be profound or just modest: the latter scenario, however, seems to be more likely.


Italy’s demography is alarming. In 2022, births reached their historical minimum of 393,000, 141,000 fewer than only ten years before, and deaths outnumbered births by 320,000. According to ISTAT (Italian National Statistical Institute), after reaching a maximum of 60.3 million in 2014, the Italian population has been decreasing for almost a decade, falling below 59 million at the beginning of 2023. The outlook on the age imbalance is even more worrying. Without migration, between 2023 and 2042, some 10 million people will turn 20 (those born over the period 2003-2022, 500,000 a year on average) and some 18 million will turn 65 (the baby-boomers, born over the period 1958-1977). Good news for young job seekers? Possibly, but while many new retirees have a maximum of 8-10 years of schooling, a large share of the new labour market entrants will hold a high school diploma or a university degree, with 13-18 years of schooling, which means that youth unemployment may coexist with job vacancies. The Italian labour market (mainly based on manufacturing and tourism), the welfare system and society as a whole will struggle to cope with such a drain on the potential workforce, and the consequences of this structural change.

These data have received wide coverage in the international press and on social media. Paradigmatic is Elon Musk’s tweet of April 7, 2023, viewed by 5.3 million people: Italy is disappearing! Is it an inescapable destiny? To discuss these issues, we compare three population forecasts, proposed respectively by the Population Division of the United Nations – UN DESA (2022), ISTAT (2022), and the Statistical Office of the European Union – Eurostat (2023).

Comparing scenarios


Migration is difficult to predict. Movements to and from other countries are influenced not only by individual choices and the economic situation, but also by the migration policies of both origin and destination countries, and by geopolitical factors, whose impact in the short and long term is not easy to evaluate. Furthermore, existing data, on which forecasts are built, may be of poor quality and insufficiently detailed (e.g. by sex and age).

In Italy, immigration appears to have been extremely variable in the past 20 years or so, but this variability probably reflects the administrative nature of the data, influenced by such events as regulatory changes (for example regularization of foreigners already living in the country), entry into the European Union of other states (e.g., Romania), political and economic crises in neighbouring countries, and so on (Figure 1, left-hand side).
Predicted levels of net migration for the period 2025-2080 vary considerably depending on the agency that produces them (Figure 1, right-hand side, and Table 1). Everybody agrees that there will (probably) be positive net migration, but the UN estimates are much lower than the other two. Furthermore, previous UN exercises (2017 and 2019) projected declining net migration, while their latest (2022) projections assume that it will remain constant throughout the period (at initially lower levels). Eurostat forecasts significantly higher net migration (and higher than in their previous forecasts), with a moderate decline over time. Finally, the ISTAT forecast is halfway between the other two, lower than in preceding versions of analogous exercises, especially in the first years.
These large differences are due to variations in the underlying assumptions. The UN predicts constant net migration over time, close to the mean of the period preceding the COVID-19 pandemic, taking into account government policies and the flows of irregular immigrants and refugees, and assuming that two-thirds of those who immigrate will return home within five years of arrival.

The methodology behind the most recent (2023) Eurostat forecasts has not been published yet, but will likely resemble that of previous publications (of 2017 and 2020), based on the attraction factor due to the decline in the active population (WAFM – Working-Age Feedback Mechanism).

The ISTAT forecast was based on the opinions of 86 experts recruited among participants at the 2019 conference of the Italian Association for Population Studies (AISP) who were asked to estimate immigration and emigration for 2050 and 2080. The probabilistic model used for the forecast was developed using the distribution of figures these experts provided. (For more details, see the references.)

Consequences for the size and structure of the Italian population


Different net migration hypotheses generate different patterns of Italian population change over the century. In Table 2, we compare the projections to 2050 and 2070. The Italian population is likely to decline in the next 50 years, but in markedly different ways in the three scenarios. From the 59 million estimated by ISTAT on 1 January 2023, it may fall to just 44 million in 2070 (–14 million) according to the UN, or to 53 million, if one believes Eurostat (–5 million), while the proportion of people aged 65 years and over fluctuates between 34% (Eurostat) and 37% (UN). Differences are smaller for young people (below 15 years) because this component is mainly affected by future fertility trends, for which the three institutions apply similar hypotheses (only slightly higher for ISTAT). Finally, the adult population will drop by about ten percentage points (somewhat less according to Eurostat, somewhat more according to the UN), tending to stabilize after 2050 due to the extinction of the baby-boomers. By 2050, the absolute size of the population aged 15-64 years is very different in the three forecasts, ranging between 27 million (UN) and 32 million (Eurostat). This represents a decline in all cases, considering that the current (2023) number is about 37 million.

What will really happen?


According to the forecasts presented here, Italian population decline and ageing are inevitable, but the severity of these trends will strongly depend on the number of net migrants. Should they be as few as hypothesized by the UN, Elon Musk’s prophecy might be very close to being fulfilled. If Eurostat’s predictions are more accurate, things will be different.

If the Italian economy does badly, Italy may be unattractive for immigrants, as in the last decade (see again Figure 1). However, if the post-COVID-19 recovery continues to be robust, a new strong wave of immigration is possible, as in the first decade of the century before the Great Recession, when they totalled around 300-350,000 per year.

The structure of the Italian labour market has not changed significantly in recent years, with a relatively high proportion of unskilled jobs, that natives are (and will be) unwilling to do. Entering and leaving Italy will probably continue to be relatively easy, because the (formally strict) laws against illegal immigration are only loosely enforced. Businesses need more workers than locals can offer, and the push factor from poor countries will remain strong for decades (Colombo and Dalla-Zuanna 2019). It therefore seems reasonable to predict that immigration will continue to be strong in the coming decades. As a consequence, as Mark Twain would put it, the reports of death (of the Italian population) are greatly exaggerated.

References

Monday, June 12, 2023

Silvio Berlusconi

Скончался бывший премьер-министр Италии Сильвио Берлускони

12 Июнь, 2023 12:13
Русская служба «Голоса Америки»
Silvio BerlusconiСильвио Берлускони

86-летний политик последние месяцы страдал лейкемией


Бывший премьер-министр Италии Сильвио Берлускони, бизнесмен-миллиардер, создавший крупнейшую в стране медиа-компанию до того, как пойти в политику, скончался в понедельник, 12 июня, в больнице в Милане.

Политику было 86 лет.

Некоторое время назад Берлускони диагностировали лейкемию. На минувшей неделе он был госпитализирован в миланскую больницу Сан-Раффаэле, откуда его выписали три недели назад после лечения от легочной инфекции, для планового медицинского осмотра.

Берлускони впервые пришел к власти в 1994 году и до 2011 года возглавлял четыре правительства. Он возглавлял правоцентристскую партию Forza Italia! («Вперёд, Италия!»). Он также был также участником ряда секс-скандалов и подозревался в коррупции.

Sunday, May 14, 2023

Catholic pronatalism

"Вы мне принесли собаку?" 

Папа Римский Франциск итальянцы не заменяют детей животных

12 мая 2023
Во время конференции Франциск благословил беременных женщин

Папа Римский Франциск посылал итальянцам рожать больше детей и не заменять их в своих семьях животных. Низкая рождаемость стала одной из самых серьезных проблем в Италии, и власти опасаются, что она может показаться резкому падению экономики.

В пятницу понтифик принял участие в конференции, посвященной демографическому кризису в Италии, и рассказал о том, как одна из верующих открыла сумку и попросила его "благословить ее малышку". Однако в сумке был не ребенок, небольшая собачка.

«Тут я вышел из себя и сделал ей выговор. Сказал, что сейчас множество детей голодает.

В Италии - один из самых низких показателей производительности в Европе. В прошлом году в стране родилось менее 400 тыс. детей, что составляет исторический минимум. При этом общее население Италии к началу 2022 года контролировалось на 250 тыс. человек.

По словам папы, в Италии для создания новой семьи нужны "титанические потери", и это возможно только для богатых людей.

В распространении понтифика говорится, что молодые люди собираются в будущее и расширяются от неопределенности. "Настоящими проблемами стали поиск стабильной работы, чрезвычайно высокая стоимость аренды жилья и недостаточная заработная плата", - заявил Франциск.

Почему падает рождаемость


Подтверждено, что один из случаев происхождения Италии оказался спорным с поиском работы для молодежи.

Премьер-итальянский министр Джордж Мелони прибыл на собрание вместе с Франциском

Многие беременные женщины в Италии вынуждают уходить с работы, а некоторые увольняют после того, как они начинают ждать ребенка.

Рождаемость падает во многих странах мира, в том числе в Японии, Южной Корее, Португалии и Пуэрто-Рико. Однако для Италии выбросы населения особенно серьезны.

Это третья по размеру экономики страны еврозоны, и к 2050 году число ее жителей может сократиться на 25% (по данным на конец 2022 года население Италии составляет около 59 миллионов человек). Принадлежащие этой стране страны быстро стареют. За последние 20 лет число итальянцев, возраст которых превысил 100 лет, выросло втрое.

Италию часто называют "страной пустых колыбелей", владельцем компаний Twitter, Tesla и SpaceX Илон Маск написал в своем твиттере: "Италия исчезает!"

Падение населения может показаться бедности.

Министр экономики Италии Джанкарло Джиоргетти заявил, что к 2042 году рождаемость в стране выросла до 18%.

"Общенациональная изменническая ситуация"


Итальянский премьер-министр Джордж Мелони, который участвовал в конференции вместе с папой Франциском, назвал случай возникновения "общенациональной принадлежности".

«Эту проблему необходимо решить в абсолютно приоритетном порядке.

Как передают корреспонденты Би-би-си в Италии, на парламентских выборах в сентябре прошлого года за Мелони проголосовало больше женщин, чем за другие проверки.

Она не считает себя феминисткой, но проблемы материнства и окружающей среды занимают в ее программе главное место.

Мелони создала специальное министерство,

Friday, December 23, 2022

Late-career employment trajectories and postretirement mortality

among Italian retirees

December 19, 2022 Benedetta Scotti

Benedetta Scotti examines the relationship between late-career trajectories and post-retirement mortality in Italy. She finds that exposure to employment instability in later working life, an increasingly prevalent phenomenon in many advanced economies, is related to poorer postretirement survival chances. The relationship is stronger if unemployment spells are prolonged and not covered by social allowances.


Employment trajectories, retirement and health


In the last decade, the relationship between employment and retirement has changed radically in many advanced economies. The long-standing post-war regime of stable and predictable careers ending directly with retirement has changed. Retirement patterns have become increasingly complex and diversified (Fasang 2010). Indeed, for an increasing share of mature workers, the period between the end of stable employment and eligibility for retirement can be quite discontinuous, marked by frequent job searches, displacement, unemployment spells, or reemployment under less advantageous occupational conditions.

Many studies have analysed the relationship between employment instability and health among young and middle-aged workers, concluding rather unanimously that weak labour market attachment and trajectories marked by spells of short- and long-term unemployment have a negative impact on self-reported health and survival (Clark and Lepinteur 2019; Devillanova et al. 2019). Little is known, however, about the relationship between employment trajectories in later working life, just before retirement, and subsequent health outcomes. In a recent study based on a large sample of Italian retirees previously employed in the private sector (Scotti 2022), I addressed this issue by examining how late-career employment trajectories shape postretirement all-cause mortality..

Empirical approach and main results


I used longitudinal register data extracted from the archives of the Italian Social Security Institute to examine late-career trajectories of a sample of 224,498 individuals who retired between 2001 and 2018, for whom mortality can be observed until the end of 2018.

I constructed sequences of employment statuses for each individual in the sample, focusing on the 10 years prior to retirement, and coding each individual annual observation according to the main employment status of that specific year (e.g., full-time or part-time dependent work, unemployment with or without social benefits). I then used cluster analysis to classify individuals into groups based on sequence similarity, separately by gender. Figure 1 shows a set of representative sequences for each cluster: for instance, men in Group 5 are characterized by employment trajectories where full-time dependent work gives way to unemployment spells not covered by social allowances.
I then examined the relationship between late-career employment trajectories and postretirement mortality, using the identified clusters as explanatory variables in survival analysis, and controlling for a set of factors that may influence both occupational trajectories and survival chances (e.g., geographical area of residence).

Among men, individuals exposed to unemployment spells prior to retirement display a higher postretirement mortality risk than those in the reference cluster (i.e., full-time employment trajectories). This relationship is stronger if unemployment spells are prolonged and not covered by social allowances, and is particularly pronounced among men living in the North of Italy, where unemployment instability is rarer, implying possibly greater social stigma with adverse consequences on health and wellbeing.

With regard to women, the employment trajectories associated with the greatest increase in postretirement mortality risk are those dominated by self-employment spells, followed by those characterized by transition from full-time private employment to unemployment, especially for women with a blue-collar employment background. That said, mortality differentials across clusters are less pronounced than for men.

A policy-relevant question could then be: what is the human cost of this increased postretirement mortality risk? To answer this question, I estimated cluster-specific survival rates using parameters from sex-specific survival models, setting control factors at sex-specific mean values. As shown in Figure 2, upon retirement, the 10-year survival rate of a man in the “Full-time employment” cluster is about 93%, falling to about 90% for men exposed to prolonged unemployment and for those who transition from full-time employment to unemployment without allowances. Among women, on the other hand, mortality disparities are markedly less pronounced. Their survival rates oscillate between 96.5% for women in the reference cluster and 95.6% for those transitioning to part-time employment.

Conclusions and policy implications


These findings suggest that late-career trajectories marked by periods of unemployment, especially if prolonged and not covered by social allowances, are related to lower postretirement survival chances, especially among men. It is important, though, to stress that such results cannot and should not be interpreted in terms of causality: while I try to attenuate reverse causality concerns by excluding individuals who experienced prolonged sickness- or injury-related leaves in any of the 10 years prior to retirement and by controlling for the receipt of pension benefits related to mental or physical impairment, health selection dynamics might still be at work.

With this limitation in mind, while referring to the specific Italian context, these results may be of interest to countries facing the challenge of extending working life to alleviate the pressure on their social security systems resulting from increased longevity. This study highlights the importance of policies to improve the employment opportunities of displaced senior workers and to ensure adequate welfare assistance in case of prolonged unemployment. It also points to the need for policy solutions that provide alternatives to labour market withdrawal before retirement age for senior workers who may struggle with full-time employment commitments. More generally, the study calls for life-course-oriented labour market policies, whereby workloads can be calibrated to age-specific skills and needs.

The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and may not reflect those of Cassa Depositi e Prestiti or any of its members.

References

  • Clark, A. E., & Lepinteur, A. (2019). The causes and consequences of early-adult unemployment: Evidence from cohort data. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 166, 107–124
  • Devillanova, C., Raitano, M., & Struffolino, E. (2019). Longitudinal employment trajectories and health in middle life: Insights from linked administrative and survey data. Demographic Research, 40, 1375–1412.
  • Fasang, A. E. (2010). Retirement: Institutional path­ways and indi­vid­ual tra­jec­to­ries in Britain and Germany. Sociological Research Online, 15(2), 1–16.
  • Scotti, B. (2022). Late-Career Employment Trajectories and Postretirement Mortality: Evidence From Italy. Demography, Advance online publication. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00703370-10291269

Monday, May 16, 2022

Students university mobility patterns in Europe

Thursday, April 21, 2022

Call for Papers

Giornate di Studio sulla Popolazione – Popdays 2023


Deadline — Fri, 09/30/2022 - 12:00


The Italian Association for Population Studies (Sis-Aisp) invites submissions to the next Giornate di Studio sulla Popolazione – Popdays 2023, the general scientific conference aimed at promoting the study and discussion of population research.

They are pleased to announce that the conference will see the participation of the Iberian Society of Historical Demography (ADEH).

Submissions should be made to one of the conference strands (organizers in parenthesis), through the submission system:
  • Ageing and intergenerational relations (Cecilia Tomassini)
  • Demography of developing countries (Raya Muttarak)
  • Human Capital and Labour Market (Giancarlo Ragozini)
  • Families and Households (Nicoletta Balbo)
  • Fertility (Daniele Vignoli)
  • Health and Wellbeing (Giulia Cavrini)
  • Internal migration and Spatial Issues (Gerardo Gallo)
  • International Migrations (Elena Ambrosetti)
  • Mortality (Elisabetta Barbi)
  • New data and methods in population studies (Emilio Zagheni)
  • Population and Environment* (Margherita Azzari)
  • Posters (Annalisa Busetta)
* In collaboration with the Italian Geographical Society.

Submission Procedure


In order to start the submission procedure, you are required to login to this conference system with your personal account. Please sign in as “Author” in order to submit a paper.
If you previously registered in a recent edition of Popdays (i.e.: Milano, Firenze, Palermo, Bressanone) you simply need to login using your current username and password. Go to the Login section.

If you forgot your username and/or password, please use the password recovery procedure through the Login Section. They suggest you to change the automatic password provided by the system at the first login. If you are not sure if you have registered before, you can contact them.

If you are a new visitor, you are requested to create a new profile (remember to sign in as “Author”).

Only after having successfully logged in, you can start the submission procedure.
Subsequent visits to the website can be made through the Login section.

Author Guidelines


Authors are asked to provide:
  • a short abstract in English (max 200 words);
  • three to five keywords
  • an extended abstract (2-4 pages) OR the full paper";
  • full names, affiliations and e-mail addresses of all co-authors.
They accept papers written both in English and Italian.
Contributions must be submitted online, through the conference website.
At most 2 submissions as presenting author are allowed.

Start here to submit a paper to this conference.
Step one of the submission process
Link
Additional Information

Monday, August 16, 2021

The Biggest Gold Medal Hauls at the Tokyo Olympics

After the two countries had been going head-to-head for the last week of the Tokyo Olympics, the U.S. beat China as the most successful nation at this year’s Olympic Games. The country clenched 113 medals in total, 39 of them gold medals, ahead of China's 88 medals (38 golden ones).

China has only once become the most successful nation at a Summer Olympic Games. At home in Beijing in 2008, Chinese athletes dominated gold medal wins, but even then, the U.S. won more medals in total - 112 - over China's 100.

China won most gold medals this year in weightlifting (7), followed by diving (5), shooting (4) and table tennis (4). The medal count also includes surprise wins, like Zhang Yufei’s gold in the 200m butterfly competition or another swimming victory in the 4x200m freestyle relay.

The United States' strong suits continue to be swimming and athletics with eleven and seven gold medals won, respectively.

Host Japan comes third for most gold medals, but fifth behind Russia and the UK for overall medals. After three gold medals for skateboarding, the country won both the baseball and the softball finals as well as hauling home nine gold medals in judo, five in wrestling and one in karate.Infographic: The Biggest Gold Medal Hauls at the Tokyo Olympics | Statista

Tuesday, May 25, 2021

Quelle divergence culturelle entre italiens et étrangers ?

Published on N-IUSSP.ORG May 24, 2021

Italians and foreigners: how distant are they, culturally speaking?


Gustavo De Santis, Mauro Maltagliati, Alessandra Petrucci

Can cultural distance hinder the integration of foreigners? The answer would be easier if we knew what cultural distance is. Gustavo De Santis, Mauro Maltagliati and Alessandra Petrucci try to measure it in Italy, with an original method. Despite the scarcity of good empirical indicators, three results seem to emerge: 1) within all groups, Italians included, heterogeneity is large; 2) foreigners from different countries differ among themselves and 3) a long stay in Italy seems to favour cultural convergence.

Cultural distances are frequently evoked, especially by researchers who need to justify what their models cannot explain, but they are very hard to define and measure. When it comes to groups (in our case national groups: Italians and foreigners of various nationalities living in Italy) the very notion of cultural distance may be based on the false assumption of internal homogeneity.

Not very clear, is it? OK, let us try with an example. Consider Figure 1 and assume that the five cultural clusters ‘make sense’, i.e. that they correctly identify five different cultural typologies. Note that we ignore the cultural characteristics of each of these typologies, and we do not need to know them, at least initially. On the y axis we read proportions: among Italians (from the South and from the two main Islands) about 30% of respondents are of type A, ~25% are of type B, … and ~17% are of type E. As the proportions are approximately the same in the two cases, we conclude that the two groups of Italians are very similar, although not internally homogeneous.

Conversely, the Chinese living in Italy have a markedly distinct distribution of individuals across typologies: only about 4% are of type A, ~28% of type B, … and as many as ~45% of type E. Muslims (a short term for immigrants ‒ of unknown religion ‒ from predominantly Muslim countries) appear to be somewhere in-between, although in their case the share of typologies B (~30%) and C (~31%) is larger than in other instances.

Two things emerge from this analysis.

  1. ‘National culture’ is not a specific typology. Each national group has (at least) five such typologies (and probably more, but in our case there are statistical indications that stopping at five categories is enough). What changes is the proportion of the members of that group (nation or area of origin) who can be classified in each of the five typologies.
  2. Based on these proportions (better: on their differences), an estimate of the relative distance between (national) groups may be attempted.

An application to Italy (2011-2013)


This is the approach that we followed in a recent paper, with data taken from two similar ISTAT surveys conducted in Italy between 2011 and 2013, the latter covering the general population, the former focused on foreigners (De Santis, Maltagliati and Petrucci, 2021).

The main results of our analysis are displayed in Figure 2, which uses proportions (those of Figure 1, but for all groups) to calculate (Euclidean) distances, and then (with little loss of information, i.e. little distortion) forces these distances to appear on a Cartesian plane.


Italians form a homogeneous group, relatively speaking. However, within Italy, a clear north-to-south gradient appears. Northern Italians are culturally closer to immigrants from neighbouring European countries (France, Germany, and North-Central Europe). Southern Italians, instead, appear closer to other nationalities, starting with those around the Mediterranean Basin.

Some countries from homogeneous regions are highlighted, such as those from Latin America, or from the Indian peninsula. The fact that they are close, in Figure 2, means that their members have a comparable distribution among the five cultural typologies mentioned at the beginning.

The Chinese living in Italy are the culturally farthest immigrant group, according to our estimates, an outcome that conforms to expectations and to other sources (e.g. ISTAT 2020).

Finally, people of foreign origin, but who later acquired the Italian nationality (labelled ‘IT2’), lie somewhere in-between: they are somewhat detached from Italians with Italian origin, but they are closer to them than any other foreign group living in Italy.

What lies behind (or better, inside) our clusters


The construction of our five clusters is based on the 11 empirical indicators listed in Figure 3: how often certain ‘objects’ are used (e.g. personal computers), or certain activities are carried out (reading books, attending concerts, etc.) or politics is discussed. Admittedly, it is not culture proper that is being evaluated here: rather, it is the use of (free) time, which is influenced by culture but also by several other factors that we cannot control for (e.g. personal resources). Our indicators are less than ideal, we admit, but this is as far as we could go if we wanted to merge the two ISTAT surveys that were needed to compare foreigners (ISTAT 2016a) with Italians (ISTAT 2016b).


Figure 3 gives an idea of the main characteristics of the members within each cluster. For example, the members of cluster C (Secluded from the social world, if we want to label them) do few or none of the listed activities, similar in this respect to the members of cluster B (Semi-secluded), who are just slightly more active when it comes to dancing, or reading newspapers and magazines. (This was the case of immigrants from predominantly Islamic countries, remember?)

In cluster E (Surfers) we find individuals who frequently use PCs and surf the internet, go to the cinema, or to concerts (all types of live music) and go dancing, but who never talk about politics (as is the case for the Chinese, in Figure 1). The members of cluster A (Active) are quite or very active in all the activities indicated, and they also talk a lot about politics: many Italians are like that (see again Figure 1). Finally, there are the members of group D, the Committed: they talk a lot about politics, keep themselves decently informed, and disdain certain facets of modernity, such as PC, internet and discos.

However, one point should be emphasized: in any national group, there are individuals of all clusters (that is, of all typologies, which seems inconsistent with such notions as ‘national homogeneity’, ‘typical traits’, and so on: what changes is (merely?) the relative frequency of the various typologies.

What do we learn from all this?


First, we must caution readers against hasty interpretation. We refer them to the original article for the limitations of our findings, in terms, for instance, of available empirical indicators to assess the ‘cultural orientation’ of our respondents, clustering criteria, and impossibility of controlling for certain covariates (age, sex, education, income, etc.; De Santis, Maltagliati and Petrucci, 2021).

Also, we do not have any empirical indication of how time and selection influence our results. For instance, let us consider people of foreign origin who are now Italians. Acquiring the Italian nationality is a long and painful process. Therefore the ‘IT2’ group has, on average, a longer period of permanent stay in the country than any other group. The fact that they are culturally closer to Italians than all others may be interpreted in two main ways:
they were selected from the start, and it is precisely this affinity that made them stay in the country and decide eventually to become Italians, they gradually got used to the ‘Italian way of thinking’, and their proximity to Italians at the end of the process indicates that people can and do change: cultural convergence is possible and is taking place.

Either way, cultural distances do not seem to be insurmountable obstacles when it comes to integrating foreigners in a host country. And, in all cases, those who evoke them can now start to measure them (if empirical data permit, of course).

Acknowledgements

Financial support is gratefully acknowledged from two sources:
1) JPI MYBL / CREW Project (Joint Programme Initiative: More Years Better Life, 2016 Call. CREW: Care, retirement and wellbeing of older people across different welfare regimes. MIUR Decree: n. 3266/2018; Official Bulletin no. 32 7. Feb 2019), and
2) MIUR-PRIN 2017 Grant (Italian Ministry of University and Research, Prot. N. 2017W5B55Y).

References

Monday, April 12, 2021

Plaisir et fidélité : la sexualité de la génération du millénaire en Italie

Published on N-IUSSP.ORG April 12, 2021

Pleasure and fidelity: Italian millennials and sex


Gianpiero Dalla Zuanna, Daniele Vignoli

Sexual intercourse is starting earlier than before among Italian adolescents, whose behaviour is converging towards the norms of their European peers. As noted by Gianpiero Dalla Zuanna and Daniele Vignoli, this precocity and the growing importance attached to romantic love are not affected by either the intense material and symbolic exchanges with parents or the (increasingly) delayed transition to adulthood.

Recent studies comparing different aspects of youth sexuality between countries and over time are relatively rare. In Italy, for instance, the latest national research based on a large statistical sample dates back to 2006 (Barbagli et al. 2010). The Sexual and Emotional Life of Youths (SELFY) survey—coordinated by Marcantonio Caltabiano, Gianpiero Dalla Zuanna, Alessandra Minello and Daniele Vignoli—aims to fill this gap, at least in part (Minello et al. 2020).

In 2017, a questionnaire was administered to 8,000 economics and statistics undergraduates, born around 1998, at 28 Italian universities. SELFY replicates an identical survey, Sexuality of Italian Students (SIS), conducted in 2000, in which 5,000 economics and statistics students born around 1980 self-completed the same closed-ended questionnaire during an hour of class time. The comparison between SIS and SELFY sheds light on many aspects of the emotional and sexual behaviour of contemporary Italian youth. The main findings are presented in a recent publication (Dalla Zuanna and Vignoli 2021), and summarized below.

The sexualization of adolescence


Sex is more important in the lives of millennials than it was among their parents and older siblings, and the emotional experiences of adolescents have become sexualized. For half of the students in all Italian regions, first sexual intercourse takes place before their 18th birthday, one or two years earlier than their parents, and only a small fraction of students are still virgins on their 21st birthday. The frequency of sexual intercourse has also increased. Discussing sex with friends and exchanging explicit erotic images via smartphone or computer is more common, and fewer young people consider virginity and chastity to be important values. It is also likely that all these behaviours and attitudes are more strongly sexualized in the population as a whole, as the students of the SIS and SELFY surveys are less sexually precocious and have less intense sexual lives than their peers (Minello et al. 2020).

These changes are consistent with the trends observed in the generations of the millennials’ grandparents, parents, and older siblings, and in Northern and Central Europe (Barbagli et al. 2010, 297; Kontula 2009; Mercer 2013). The sexual debut of Italian youth no longer occurs at a later age than their European peers, and differences between the Italian regions have narrowed considerably. Other internal differences within the Italian population have also diminished, starting with religiosity, until recently a strongly discriminating factor (Barbagli et al. 2010, chap. 9). Not only has the religious practice of young people decreased drastically over the last twenty years, but many millennials close to the church also behave similarly to non-religious people, no longer attaching importance to chastity or seeing sexuality solely in terms of its reproductive function. This process of convergence—across the countries of Europe and across different social groups and territories within Italy—is similar to that observed for other components of the Second Demographic Transition such as nonmarital cohabitation and childbearing (Lesthaeghe 2020).

The revival of romantic love


Less obvious is the revival of romantic love in the context of intimate relationships. There are several signs of this new trend. Being unfaithful is rarer among millennials than among previous generations, and the vast majority of surveyed students believe that infidelity is incompatible with being in a couple. Frequency of sexual intercourse is much higher among couples than among singles. Both single men and women who are no longer virgins practice casual intercourse, but only a small minority of singles adopt casual sex as a lifestyle. Compared to previous generations, the average annual number of partners has decreased in the first stages of sexual life.

While single non-virgins are, on average, sexually dissatisfied, almost all of those in a relationship report being sexually satisfied. In short, in the first years of sexual life, millennials do not assign a predominantly hedonistic meaning to sexuality as may have been the case among older male generations (Barbagli et al. 2010, 296). On the contrary, in their emotional lives, sex and love are closely interrelated from the moment of first sexual intercourse.

Both in Italy and elsewhere in Europe (Kontula 2009, chap. 8), the revival of romantic love seems to be part of a more general revolution in intimacy. One of the key changes in contemporary intimate life is the emphasis placed on attraction between partners as the constitutive basis of the couple relationship, which goes hand in hand with the de-institutionalization of the relationship itself (Van de Kaa 1987). This emphasis is also the basis of other features of the Second Demographic Transition, such as the disappearance of arranged marriages, the spread of cohabitation, extra-nuptial births, and union dissolution. If mutual attraction is a precondition for the very existence of a couple relationship, everything else takes a back seat: “If we love each other, what is the point of getting married?” “If we don’t love each other anymore, what’s the point of being together?” and so on. Even if marriage represents a distinct arrangement as compared to cohabitation due to its higher level of commitment, infidelity becomes difficult to justify, irrespective of the type of union, because it testifies to a weakening or lack of mutual attraction. Sex with occasional partners also loses much of its charm because physical attraction is only one of the components of attraction between partners, necessary but not sufficient to achieve complete sexual satisfaction.

Becoming adults


What is the place of sexuality in the larger context of emerging adulthood in Italy (Arnett 2014)? In many ways, the sexual behavior of young Italians is converging with that of their European peers, similarly to what is happening in other aspects of the Second Demographic Transition, such as the practice of living together before (or instead of) getting married, or having children outside marriage (Pirani and Vignoli 2016).

In our book (Dalla Zuanna and Vignoli 2021), we also show that the sexuality and attachment to romantic love of Italian adolescents, whose behavior is converging towards the norms of their European peers, is not affected by either the tradition of strong material and symbolic family bonds, which persists, or the postponement of independent living that characterizes emerging adulthood in the Bel Paese.

References

  • Arnett, J.J. 2014 Emerging adulthood: the winding road from the late teens through the twenties, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Barbagli, M., Dalla Zuanna, G. and Garelli, F. 2010 La sessualità degli italiani, Bologna, Il Mulino.
  • Billari, F.C., Caltabiano, M. and Dalla Zuanna, G. (a cura di) 2007 Sexual and affective behaviour of students. An international research, Padova. Cleup.
  • Dalla Zuanna, G. and Vignoli, D. 2021 Piacere e fedeltà. I millennials italiani e il sesso, Bologna, il Mulino.
  • Kontula, O. 2009 Between sexual desire and reality. The evolution of sex in Finland, Helsinky, Publications of the Population Research Institute, D49.
  • Lesthaeghe, R. 2020 The second demographic transition, 1986–2020: sub-replacement fertility and rising cohabitation – a global update, Genus, 76, 10: on-line.
  • Mercer, C.H. et al. 2013 Changes in sexual attitudes and lifestyles in Britain through the life course and over time: findings from the National Surveys of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles (Natsal), Lancet, 382: 1781-1794.
  • Minello, A., Caltabiano, M., Dalla Zuanna, G. and Vignoli, D. 2020 Catching up! The sexual behaviour and opinions of Italian students (2000-2017), Genus, 76, 16: on-line.
  • Pirani, E. and Vignoli, D. (2016). Changes in the satisfaction of cohabitors relative to spouses over time, Journal of Marriage and Family, 78(3): 598-609.
  • Van de Kaa, D.J. 1987 Europe’s second demographic transition, Population Bulletin, 42(1): 1-57.
любопытно: в РФ (и др.местах) ситуёвина противо по ложная

Wednesday, November 25, 2020

Oudenburg

Интимный Ауденбург


Ауденбург(Oudenburg)... Я бы наверное никогда не узнал о существовании этого фламандского городка, если бы не приглашение приехать в местный археологический музей, где открылась выставка под названием Roma intima - Интимный Рим.

Пара с собачкой у входа в публичный дом. Около I в.н.э. [по ссылке (выше) есть продолжение — там есть про собачку объяснение. Дальше названия рисунков над картинкой]

Ауденбург находится примерно в 20 км к западу от Брюгге и в 10 км от Северного моря. Когда я впервые услышал о здешнем Римском археологическом музее, то слегка удивился: где Рим, и где Фландрия? И почему вдруг археологический музей находится в маленьком городке с населением 9 тыс жителей, который можно, наверное, назвать и деревней? Оказалось, на всё есть свои причины. В первые века нашей эры на этом месте находился римский каструм - постоянный укрепленный лагерь, своего рода военная база Римской империи. Вокруг него постепенно вырос городок, который продолжил свое существование и когда римляне ушли.

В фойе Римского археологического музея Ауденбурга

Фактически, музей возник вокруг раскопок римского лагеря и окружавших его поселений, а экспонатами его являются находки археологов: монеты, оружие, стекло, амфоры, чаши, кувшины, гребни, плащи, предметы из найденных в округе захоронений.

Форма римского знаменосца (вексиллярия)

Звериная шкура знаменосца подчеркивала его особый статус, выделяла среди остальных воинов. Знамя, которое носил вексиллярий, представляло собой прямоугольный штандарт с эмблемой и номером подразделения, насаженный на длинное деревянное древко.

Одно из захоронений римских времен (IV в.н.э.), найденное близ Ауденбурга.

В конце февраля 2020 года, еще до начала эпидемии ковида, музей открыл небольшую выставку, посвященную интимной жизни в римском обществе и военных лагерях. Вот несколько ее экспонатов.

Античная масляная лампа, III-IV в.н.э.

Эротическая тематика рисунков и рельефов на лампах должна была способствовать любовным утехам и помогать продолжению рода.

Женские кожаные трусы.

По-видимому, подобные трусы использовались как одежда для физических упражнений, но не как нижнее белье. Пример можно увидеть на мозаиках сицилийской виллы Арретино.

Мозаика виллы Арретино, Сицилия, III в.

Фаллический культ [интересно: вагинальный был?] был в римском обществе одним из самых распространенных. Фаллос являлся символом плодородия, удачи, власти. Считалось, что его изображение или изваяние охраняет от воров и грабителей, отводит "дурной глаз". Фигурки-фаллосы называли "fascinum" по имени фаллического божеста Фасцина, защитника от колдовства и злых демонов.

Фаллические фигурки - храмовые жертвоприношения (1), приворотный столп (2), амулеты (внизу).

Маленькие фаллосы носили на шее как амулеты, использовали как обереги, охраняющие дом или человека. Боги Приап и Меркурий иногда изображались в форме фаллосо-подобных фигурок с крылышками, что подчеркивало их божественное происхождение. Подобные обереги, спрятанные в золотые футлярчики, надевали детям, а римские воины, возвращаясь с победой, прикрепляли фаллосы-амулеты к колесницам, чтобы ослабить силу завистливых взглядов.

Фаллос-колокольчик вешали при входе в дом или в лавку [обычный мудозвон]

Следующий экспонат-инсталляция показывает туалет римского военного лагеря. Впрочем, практически такими же были и публичные римские туалеты, с той только разницей, что последние были больше и богаче: с мраморными сиденьями, фонтаном в центре и платой за вход (а заранее нагревать холодные каменные сидения хозяева посылали своих рабов). В желобе у ног текла вода, туда макали палку-подтиралку, на конце которой была привязана губка. Вертикальные дырки под сиденьями, которые отсутствуют в нынешних толчках и унитазах, как раз и предназначены для просовывания подтиралок.

На стенах видны типичные "туалетные" рисунки и надписи - многие из них известны по помпейским раскопкам. Одну надпись я пытался перевести (Cacator, sic valeas ut tu hoc locum traseas), у меня получилось что-то типа: "Засранец, может ты наконец уберешься отсюда", но утверждать не буду, в латыни я не силен :).

В руках у "заседателя" прообраз современного порно-журнала, вполне возможно, что такие картинки были характерны для небогатой солдатской среды (писали и рисовали тогда на папирусе, поставлявшемся из Египта).

Те, кто скопил или отложил немного денег, мог не ограничиваться картинками, а посетить публичный дом. В римском обществе он назывался лупанарий, дословно - "логово волчиц" - так в обиходе называли проституток. Лупанарий представлял из себя отдельное здание со множеством комнат-клетушек, в большинстве своем даже без окон, таких маленьких, что в них помещалось одно только рабочее ложе.

Над входом писалось имя жрицы любви (типа "Прекрасная гречанка", "Нежный цветок", и т.п.) и помещалась картинка, иллюстрирующая предоставляемые услуги. Задернутая занавеска означала, что хозяйка клетушки занята, отдернутая приглашала клиента зайти.

Спинтрии

Большинство этих «монеток» отчеканены из бронзы и имеют эротический сюжет. На оборотной стороне обычно находятся римские цифры от I до XX, значение которых пока не установлено. По наиболее распространенной гипотезе эти жетоны использовались для оплаты труда проституток. Их получали в обмен на деньги, которые собирала матрона, управлявшая лупанарием. При этом исходят из факта, что разного рода жетоны широко использовались в Риме в качестве входных билетов на зрелища, при проведении лотерей и т.п. Но существуют также мнения, что спинтрии применялись в качестве игральных фишек, или как номерки гардероба для посетителей бань. Так или иначе, само слово "спинтрия" являлось в Риме презрительным прозвищем бисексуалов.

Картины эротического содержания были достаточно распространены в римском обществе и украшали не только бордели, но и богатые патрицианские дома; некоторые из них поднимались до уровня художественности и психологизма.

Фреска из Помпей, I в.н.э. Национальный археологический музей, Неаполь
лесбиянки. штоли?

Sunday, August 30, 2020

Modelling COVID-19 mortality at the regional level in Italy

Италия и ковид
Italy was harshly hit by COVID-19, registering more than 35,000 deaths between February and July, 2020. The virus spread unequally across the country, with northern regions witnessing more cases and deaths than those in the centre and south. We investigate demographic and socio-economic factors that contributed to the diverse regional impact of the virus in Italy. Within a smoothing framework, we divide regions into three well-defined groups of High, Middle and Low mortality by cluster analysis. Extending the Poisson regression model to account for regional clusters, we find that COVID-mortality is positively associated with the share of ICU utilization, GDP per capita, proportion of the older population and the number of COVID-19 positive cases, while it is negatively associated with the delay of region-specific outbreaks and the number of tests performed. Our results have relevant policy implications for potential resurgence of COVID-19 infections in Italy and across the world.

Источники: тут и тут
карта тыцабельна, на самом деле — существенно больше

Saturday, August 1, 2020

we can return to our sodomy

Girolamo Savonarola
сабж
“When the theocrat Savonarola, was burned at the stake in 1498, one high-level magistrate, eyeing the rising flames of the pyre, heaved a heavy sigh of relief. ‘Thank God,’ he grunted. ‘Now we can return to our sodomy.’ “

Girolamo Savonarola — 21 September 1452 – 23 May 1498) was an Italian Dominican friar from Ferrara and preacher active in Renaissance Florence. He was known for his prophecies of civic glory, the destruction of secular art and culture, and his calls for Christian renewal. He denounced clerical corruption, despotic rule and the exploitation of the poor. He prophesied the coming of a biblical flood and a new Cyrus from the north who would reform the Church.

Wednesday, June 3, 2020

life expectancy and lifespan inequality

Published on N-IUSSP.ORG June 1, 2020

On the (changing) relationship between life expectancy and lifespan inequality


José Manuel Aburto, Ginevra Floridi, Ella Fegitz

Life expectancy at birth is widely employed to measure longevity. However, as José Manuel Aburto, Ginevra Floridi and Ella Fegitz argue, another complementary dimension of great relevance in health research and policy intervention is inequality in the length of life or lifespan inequality.

What are life expectancy and lifespan inequality?


Life expectancy at birth is a measure of the mean level of mortality. Simply put, it expresses the average number of years a newborn is expected to live given the mortality conditions at a point in time. Because it is an average, life expectancy does not show differences in length of life among individuals; these differences can be substantial, however. To fully understand mortality at the population level, life expectancy can be complemented by lifespan inequality, which measures variation in ages at death, capturing differences in lifespans. Lifespan inequality has been described as the most fundamental of all inequalities, because every other type of inequality is conditional upon being alive (van Raalte, Sasson, & Martikainen, 2018). Its level and evolution can tell us much about how equitably health improvements are allocated in a society.

At the individual level, lifespan inequality gauges the unpredictability of the timing of death. For example, using the standard deviation of ages at death (SD) as a measure of lifespan inequality, it was considerably more difficult to predict how long a newborn in Italy would live in 1920 (SD = 31.6 years) than it was in 2017 (SD = 12.4 years) because in 1920 deaths were more widely spread across different ages (Figure 1).
фиг 1

How does life expectancy relate to lifespan inequality?


In 1920, 13.3% of females born in Italy died before their first birthday and less than 10% of them were expected to reach the age of 82. In contrast, 99.7% of female babies born in 2017 survived to their first birthday and almost 70% of them are expected to be alive in 2100 (Figure 1). This exceptional progress in reducing mortality has raised life expectancy at birth from 46.4 years to almost 85 years over the last century. At the same time, life chances have become more equitable, i.e. lifespan inequality has decreased (Figure 2).
фигсдва
Higher levels of life expectancy usually correspond to lower levels of lifespan inequality (Figure 2 and e.g. Smits and Monden 2009). However, historically, this has not always been the case. In certain countries, lifespan inequality has been shown to stall or even increase during specific periods despite improvements in life expectancy, or vice versa. In Venezuela, for instance, between 1996 and 2013 life expectancy increased (from 69.4 to 71 years), but lifespan inequality also increased (SD from 20.7 to 21.7 years) because progress in reducing mortality at almost all ages, including infant mortality, was counteracted by a rise in violent deaths concentrated among young males (García & Aburto, 2019).

A recent article shows that changes in both life expectancy and lifespan inequality can be expressed as rates of progress in reducing mortality (Aburto et al 2020). For example, in 1920’s Italy, the biggest gains in life expectancy were achieved if progress was concentrated in infancy. By contrast, in today’s Italy, reducing infant death rates by 5% leads to the same gain in life expectancy as reducing mortality at age 79 by 5%. Lifespan inequality is reduced significantly if lives are saved at infancy but increases if lives are saved at older ages (Figure 3). This has potential implications for the relationship between life expectancy and lifespan inequality. In contemporary societies, where rising life expectancy is often attributable to improvements in old-age mortality, increases in lifespan inequality may become more frequent.
фиг3

Societal implications of increased lifespan inequality


Lifespan inequality is important because people making major life decisions are influenced by the mortality experience of those around them. Subjective beliefs about one’s lifespan have been shown to affect decisions such as whether and when to invest in education, save, buy a house, or retire (e.g. Bloom et al., 2006).

A potential weakening or reversal of the negative relationship between lifespan inequality and life expectancy means that, while people live longer on average, individuals also face greater uncertainty about when they will die. Studies have shown that such increased uncertainty within a society is likely to be concentrated among those from disadvantaged socio-economic groups. For example, in Finland, between 1971 and 2014, lifespan inequality increased among subgroups with low educational attainment and low income but decreased among more advantaged groups (van Raalte et al., 2018). This represents a “double burden” for lower socio-economic groups experiencing not only shorter lifespans but also higher uncertainty compared to the more advantaged groups.

Diverging patterns in lifespan inequality across socioeconomic groups may have important consequences for the perpetuation of social inequalities. For instance, faced with greater uncertainty about their own lifespan, individuals from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds risk making unfavorable financial decisions that might further reduce their financial resources later in life. Lifespan inequality is also likely to create uncertainty about the timing of inheritances and financial bequests among family members. If this uncertainty is concentrated among lower socio-economic groups, poorer individuals may not only receive smaller transfers from their parents and grandparents than the rich; they may also be less able to anticipate the timing of those transfers. Given the importance of these transfers for the recipients’ socio-economic conditions, higher lifespan inequality may strengthen the transmission of disadvantage across generations, reducing intergenerational social mobility.

The significance of including lifespan inequality in policy and research


Increasing the average age at death alone is not enough to guarantee a more equitable distribution of the length of life. An important message of recent research is that policies and interventions can affect this relationship by reducing mortality at ages that matter the most (Aburto et al., 2020). In terms of policy interventions, one key question to ask is how different types of healthcare investments, such as preventive as opposed to end-of-life care, may relate to inequality in lifespans. It is also important to understand how the strength of the relationship between life expectancy and lifespan inequality varies across societies and periods characterized by different levels of social inequality. There is reason to believe that more equal or socially cohesive societies may be more effective at reducing lifespan inequality, for example by reducing violent crime or providing better access to preventive healthcare across all socio-economic groups. These are promising avenues for future research linking demographic phenomena to the broader societal context in which they take place, with important implications for social policy.

*The authors thank Jim Oeppen for thoughtful comments and suggestions.

References

Wednesday, May 20, 2020

Migrants’ fertility in Italy: a comparison between origin and destination

Published on N-IUSSP.ORG May 18, 2020

Roberto Impicciatore, Giuseppe Gabrielli, Anna Paterno

It is rarely possible to compare stayers in an origin country, migrants from that country, and non-migrants in the destination country. In the case of Italy, however, Roberto Impicciatore, Giuseppe Gabrielli, and Anna Paterno analyze the fertility of immigrants from Morocco, Albania, and Ukraine, comparing it with that of non-movers, both in Italy and in the three origin countries. Results reveal the variety of migration and fertility strategies of these groups.

The relationship between fertility and migration is complex because migrants are both selected and highly heterogeneous in their migration paths and living conditions at destination. To shed light on migrant fertility, scholars should compare their behavior with that of two non-migrant groups: those of the destination countries and those in the origin countries who did not migrate. This double comparison would help to understand whether the reproductive behavior of migrants reflects the values, norms, and traditions that they absorbed during their childhood or, conversely, is affected by their life and migration experiences. Unfortunately, this comparative approach is rarely applicable: while data in destination countries are frequently available (Beauchemin, 2014), those in origin countries typically are not, and this has led to a sort of “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2003), i.e. a tendency to view the nation-state as the unit of analysis.

As an exception, in a recent study (Impicciatore, Gabrielli, and Paterno, 2020) we provided an original and comprehensive picture of migrants’ fertility in Italy, merging five different datasets. Data were taken from the Italian “Social Condition and Integration of Foreigners” survey (SCIF) carried out in 2011-2012, were combined with data on non-migrants living both in Italy (Multipurpose survey on “Families and Social Subjects” – FSS 2009), and in the three most important countries of origin: Albania, Morocco, and Ukraine (Demographic and Health Surveys conducted, respectively, in 2008-09, 2003-04, and 2007).

A fragmented scenario of migrants in Italy


The history of immigration to Italy is relatively recent and stratified into different periods (Buonomo et al., 2020). Foreign immigration in Italy started in the late 1970s, the main origin areas being Northern Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt), the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (Philippines, China, and Sri Lanka). East-West migration increased during the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the arrival of Albanians, and then of ex-Yugoslavian citizens during the Balkans conflict. The migration of workers from Central Europe (from countries such as Poland and Romania) increased likewise. Large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers have also arrived in recent years (Strozza and Gabrielli, 2020). Overall, there are currently around 6 million foreign residents in Italy, with widely different geographical origins, migration histories, and degrees of integration. Among the non-EU female population, Albanians, Moroccans, and Ukrainians currently constitute the largest national groups (“third countries”) representing, respectively, 12.1%, 11.1%, and 10.4% of the total number of resident non-EU women (Register data as of December 31, 2018).

Fertility at home and abroad


The increased number of births to immigrant parents (18% of births with at least one foreign parent in 2009, 22% in 2018) is the most immediate sign of the impact of foreigners on Italian fertility. Among migrants, however, there is considerable heterogeneity in the transition to parenthood (Mussino and Strozza, 2012; Ortensi 2015). For instance, most Ukrainian women (77%) had a child before migrating, versus only 42% of Moroccans and 45% of Albanians (Figure 1).
f1
Median ages at first childbirth (irrespective of the child’s country of birth) (Table 1) show that the difference between migrants and stayers is negligible for women from Albania but larger for those from Morocco and Ukraine (delay of +1.9 and +3.4 years, respectively, concerning stayers). Figure 2 displays the Kaplan-Meier survival function, i.e. (a) the proportion of childless women, and (b) women with only one child, by age and migration background. Migrants from Ukraine are similar to stayers in that country at an early age, but they drastically reduce their propensity for childbearing after age 20. There are no significant differences in survival functions between migrants and stayers from Albania, whereas migrants from Morocco tend to postpone the first childbirth for stayers. The difference disappears after age 30, however. Finally, first childbirth clearly occurs much later (compared to the other groups) among non-migrant women in Italy.
t1

f2

The delaying effect of migration is even more evident for the transition to second childbirth (Figure 2b): the Kaplan-Meier functions of migrants are higher than those of stayers in the three countries of origin. In particular, the pattern of migrants from Albania overlaps with that of non-migrants in Italy, whereas both migrants and stayers from Ukraine have the highest curves, indicating a delayed transition and a lower intensity (even later and lower than the Italians). Conversely, for Morocco, the two survival curves (of migrants and stayers) are relatively close to each other and tend to converge as time since first birth increases.

Different fertility models for different migration models


Overall, among Moroccan women, childbearing is similar between movers (to Italy) and stayers (in Morocco), and significantly higher than among Italian women. This suggests the persistence of behaviors acquired in the context of origin. For first births, the fertility of Albanian women is similar for movers and stayers, but not for the second, for which Albanian women who immigrated to Italy “behave like Italians”. Ukrainians show “transition risks” (i.e. fertility behaviors) that are quite different from those of both Italian natives and Ukrainian stayers. These results are also fully confirmed by multivariate analyses (not shown here) that include, among other covariates, age at migration, thus distinguishing between children born in Italy or abroad, and taking into account the educational selectivity of migrants (see Impicciatore et al 2020).

Our results indicate that beyond individual characteristics, both migration strategies and country of origin affect fertility. Migrants from the three origin countries considered here reflect at least two different migration models in Italy. In the first classic model (observed mostly among migrants from southern and eastern Mediterranean countries), men arrive for work reasons at relatively young ages and are the “forerunners” in the process of settlement in the destination country. This is the case for Moroccans, characterized by a large proportion of single men, and also of Albanians, who tend to opt for a familial pattern, however, with a large percentage of migrant couples. The “female breadwinner” migration model observed mostly among migrants from Eastern Europe and Latin America is completely different. Here, the main actors are women, who typically arrive in Italy at an older age, with a previous family history, and are actively engaged in the labor market.

Bibliography


  • Beauchemin, C. (2014). A manifesto for quantitative multi-sited approaches to international migration. International Migration Review, 48(4), 921–938.
  • Buonomo A., Gabrielli G., Strozza S. (2020), Former Soviet Union Migration to Italy: Characteristics and Determinants of Women Condition in the Italian Labour Market, in Denisenko M., Strozza S., Light M. (eds) Migration from the Newly Independent States. 25 Years After the collapse of the USSR (pp. 295-421). Societies and Political Orders in Transition. Springer, Cham.
  • Impicciatore, R., Gabrielli, G. & Paterno, A. (2020). Migrants’ Fertility in Italy: A Comparison Between Origin and Destination. European Journal of Population.
  • Mussino, E., & Strozza, S. (2012). Does citizenship still matter? Second birth risks of resident foreigners in Italy. European Journal of Population, 28(3), 269–302.
  • Ortensi, L. E. (2015). Engendering the fertility-migration nexus: The role of women’s migratory patterns in the analysis of fertility after migration. Demographic Research, 32(53), 1435–1468.
  • Strozza S., Gabrielli G. (2020), Demographic Profile of Syrians in Italy, in Carlson E.D., Williams E.D. (eds) Comparative Demography of the Syrian Diaspora: European and Middle Eastern Destinations, European Studies of Population, Springer, Cham, 20: 237-259.
  • Wimmer, A., & Glick-Schiller, N. (2003). Methodological nationalism, the social sciences, and the study of migration: An essay in historical epistemology. International Migration Review, 37(3), 576–610.

Monday, April 13, 2020

all-causes deaths in two Italian cities

Friday, April 3, 2020

death counts in two Italian cities

из твиттера

Well done. Italian National Institute of Statistics also released new data on deaths for all causes. It turns out (see graph, the age distribution of men deaths in the first quarter of 2019 and 2020 in two cities) that the rise of mortality involves young people as well. 

Monday, October 21, 2019

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Tuesday, October 15, 2019

Vicious bigotry, reluctant acceptance

How Italians Became ‘White

Vicious bigotry, reluctant acceptance:
an Ameican Story


By Brent Staples
Mr. Staples is a member of the NYT editorial board.

OCT. 12, 2019
Newly arrived Italians waiting to be processed at Ellis Island around 1905. Photograph by Lewis Hine, via Bettmann Archive/Getty Images

Congress envisioned a white, Protestant and culturally homogeneous America when it declared in 1790 that only “free white persons, who have, or shall migrate into the United States” were eligible to become naturalized citizens. The calculus of racism underwent swift revision when waves of culturally diverse immigrants from the far corners of Europe changed the face of the country.

As the historian Matthew Frye Jacobson shows in his immigrant history “Whiteness of a Different Color,” the surge of newcomers engendered a national panic and led Americans to adopt a more restrictive, politicized view of how whiteness was to be allocated. Journalists, politicians, social scientists and immigration officials embraced the habit, separating ostensibly white Europeans into “races.” Some were designated “whiter” — and more worthy of citizenship — than others, while some were ranked as too close to blackness to be socially redeemable. The story of how Italian immigrants went from racialized pariah status in the 19th century to white Americans in good standing in the 20th offers a window onto the alchemy through which race is constructed in the United States, and how racial hierarchies can sometimes change.

Darker skinned southern Italians endured the penalties of blackness on both sides of the Atlantic. In Italy, Northerners had long held that Southerners — particularly Sicilians — were an “uncivilized” and racially inferior people, too obviously African to be part of Europe.

Racist dogma about Southern Italians found fertile soil in the United States. As the historian Jennifer Guglielmo writes, the newcomers encountered waves of books, magazines and newspapers that “bombarded Americans with images of Italians as racially suspect.” They were sometimes shut out of schools, movie houses and labor unions, or consigned to church pews set aside for black people. They were described in the press as “swarthy,” “kinky haired” members of a criminal race and derided in the streets with epithets like “dago,” “guinea” — a term of derision applied to enslaved Africans and their descendants — and more familiarly racist insults like “white nigger” and “nigger wop.”
Italian-Americans were often used as cheap labor on
the docks of New Orleans at the turn of the last century.Library of Congress
Mulberry Street in the Little Italy
section of New York around 1900.Library of Congress

The penalties of blackness went well beyond name-calling in the apartheid South. Italians who had come to the country as “free white persons” were often marked as black because they accepted “black” jobs in the Louisiana sugar fields or because they chose to live among African-Americans. This left them vulnerable to marauding mobs like the ones that hanged, shot, dismembered or burned alive thousands of black men, women and children across the South.

The federal holiday honoring the Italian explorer Christopher Columbus — celebrated on Monday — was central to the process through which Italian-Americans were fully ratified as white during the 20th century. The rationale for the holiday was steeped in myth, and allowed Italian-Americans to write a laudatory portrait of themselves into the civic record.

Few who march in Columbus Day parades or recount the tale of Columbus’s voyage from Europe to the New World are aware of how the holiday came about or that President Benjamin Harrisonproclaimed it as a one-time national celebration in 1892 — in the wake of a bloody New Orleans lynching that took the lives of 11 Italian immigrants. The proclamation was part of a broader attempt to quiet outrage among Italian-Americans, and a diplomatic blowup over the murders that brought Italy and the United States to the brink of war.

Historians have recently showed that America’s dishonorable response to this barbaric event was partly conditioned by racist stereotypes about Italians promulgated in Northern newspapers like The Times. A striking analysis by Charles Seguin, a sociologist at Pennsylvania State University, and Sabrina Nardin, a doctoral student at the University of Arizona, shows that the protests lodged by the Italian government inspired something that had failed to coalesce around the brave African-American newspaper editor and anti-lynching campaigner Ida B. Wells — a broad anti-lynching effort.

A Black ‘Brute’ Lynched


The lynchings of Italians came at a time when newspapers in the South had established the gory convention of advertising the far more numerous public murders of African-Americans in advance — to attract large crowds — and justifying the killings by labeling the victims “brutes,” “fiends,” “ravishers,” “born criminals” or “troublesome Negroes.” Even high-minded news organizations that claimed to abhor the practice legitimized lynching by trafficking in racist stereotypes about its victims.

As Mr. Seguin recently showed, many Northern newspapers were “just as complicit” in justifying mob violence as their Southern counterparts. For its part, The Times made repeated use of the headline “A Brutal Negro Lynched,” presuming the victims’ guilt and branding them as congenital criminals. Lynchings of black men in the South were often based on fabricated accusations of sexual assault. As the Equal Justice Initiative explained in its 2015 report on lynching in America, a rape charge could occur in the absence of an actual victim and might arise from minor violations of the social code — like complimenting a white woman on her appearance or even bumping into her on the street.

The Times was not owned by the family that controls it today when it dismissed Ida B. Wells as a “slanderous and nasty-minded mulattress” for rightly describing rape allegations as “a thread bare lie” that Southerners used against black men who had consensual sexual relationships with white women. Nevertheless, as a Times editorialist of nearly 30 years standing — and a student of the institution’s history — I am outraged and appalled by the nakedly racist treatment my 19th-century predecessors displayed in writing about African-Americans and Italian immigrants.

When Wells took her anti-lynching campaign to England in the 1890s, Times editors rebuked her for representing “black brutes” abroad in an editorial that joked about what they described as “the practice of roasting Negro ravishers alive and boring out their eyes with red-hot pokers.” The editorial slandered African-Americans generally, referring to rape as “a crime to which Negroes are particularly prone.” The Times editors may have lodged objections to lynching — but they did so in a rhetoric firmly rooted in white supremacy.

‘Assassins by Nature’


Italian immigrants were welcomed into Louisiana after the Civil War, when the planter class was in desperate need of cheap labor to replace newly emancipated black people, who were leaving backbreaking jobs in the fields for more gainful employment.

These Italians seemed at first to be the answer to both the labor shortage and the increasingly pressing quest for settlers who would support white domination in the emerging Jim Crow state. Louisiana’s romance with Italian labor began to sour when the new immigrants balked at low wages and dismal working conditions.

The newcomers also chose to live together in Italian neighborhoods, where they spoke their native tongue, preserved Italian customs and developed successful businesses that catered to African-Americans, with whom they fraternized and intermarried. In time, this proximity to blackness would lead white Southerners to view Sicilians, in particular, as not fully white and to see them as eligible for persecution — including lynching — that had customarily been imposed on African-Americans.

Clams being sold from a cart in Little Italy.Library of Congress

Many Italian-Americans lived in a section of New
Orleans that became known as Little Palermo.Library of Congress

Nevertheless, as the historian Jessica Barbata Jackson showed recently in the journal Louisiana History, Italian newcomers were still well thought of in New Orleans in the 1870s when negative stereotypes were being established in the Northern press.

The Times, for instance, described them as bandits and members of the criminal classes who were “wretchedly poor and unskilled,” “starving and wholly destitute.” The stereotype about inborn criminality is plainly evident in an 1874 story about Italian immigrants seeking vaccinations that refers to one immigrant as a “burly fellow, whose appearance was like that of the traditional brigand of the Abruzzi.”

A Times story in 1880 described immigrants, including Italians, as “links in a descending chain of evolution.” These characterizations reached a defamatory crescendo in an 1882 editorial that appeared under the headline “Our Future Citizens.” The editors wrote:
“There has never been since New York was founded so low and ignorant a class among the immigrants who poured in here as the Southern Italians who have been crowding our docks during the past year.”
The editors reserved their worst invective for Italian immigrant children, whom they described as “utterly unfit — ragged, filthy, and verminous as they were — to be placed in the public primary schools among the decent children of American mechanics.”
The racist myth that African-Americans and Sicilians were both innately criminal drove an 1887 Times story about a lynching victim in Mississippi whose name was given as “Dago Joe” — “dago” being a slur directed at Italian and Spanish-speaking immigrants. The victim was described as a “half breed” who “was the son of a Sicilian father and a mulatto mother, and had the worst characteristics of both races in his makeup. He was cunning, treacherous and cruel, and was regarded in the community where he lived as an assassin by nature.”

Sicilians as ‘Rattlesnakes’


The carnage in New Orleans was set in motion in the fall of 1890, when the city’s popular police chief, David Hennessy, was assassinated on his way home one evening. Hennessy had no shortage of enemies. The historian John V. Baiamonte Jr. writes that he had once been tried for murder in connection with the killing of a professional rival. He is also said to have been involved in a feud between two Italian businessmen. On the strength of a clearly suspect witness who claimed to hear Mr. Hennessy say that “dagoes” had shot him, the city charged 19 Italians with complicity in the chief’s murder.

The monument to David Hennessy rises above nearly all
the other tombs in Metairie Cemetery in New Orleans.William Widmer for The New York Times

That the evidence was distressingly weak was evident from the verdicts that were swiftly handed down: Of the first nine to be tried, six were acquitted; three others were granted mistrials. The leaders of the mob that then went after them advertised their plans in advance, knowing full well that the city’s elites — who coveted the businesses the Italians had built or hated the Italians for fraternizing with African-Americans — would never seek justice for the dead. After the lynching, a grand jury investigation pronounced the killings praiseworthy, turning that inquiry into what the historian Barbara Botein describes as “possibly one of the greatest whitewashes in American history.”

The blood of the New Orleans victims was scarcely dry when The Times published a cheerleading news story — “Chief Hennessy Avenged: Eleven of his Italian Assassins Lynched by a Mob” — that reveled in the bloody details. It reported that the mob had consisted “mostly of the best element” of New Orleans society. The following day, a scabrous Times editorial justified the lynching — and dehumanized the dead, with by-now-familiar racist stereotypes.


“These sneaking and cowardly Sicilians,” the editors wrote, “the descendants of bandits and assassins, who have transported to this country the lawless passions, the cutthroat practices … are to us a pest without mitigations. Our own rattlesnakes are as good citizens as they. Our own murderers are men of feeling and nobility compared to them.” The editors concluded of the lynching that it would be difficult to find “one individual who would confess that privately he deplores it very much.”

Lynchers in 1891 storming the New Orleans city jail, where they killed 11 Italian-Americans accused in the fatal shooting of Chief Hennessy.Italian Tribune

President Harrison would have ignored the New Orleans carnage had the victims been black. But the Italian government made that impossible. It broke off diplomatic relations and demanded an indemnity that the Harrison administration paid. Harrison even called on Congress in his 1891 State of the Union to protect foreign nationals — though not black Americans — from mob violence.

Harrison’s Columbus Day proclamation in 1892 opened the door for Italian-Americans to write themselves into the American origin story, in a fashion that piled myth upon myth. As the historian Danielle Battisti shows in “Whom We Shall Welcome,” they rewrote history by casting Columbus as “the first immigrant” — even though he never set foot in North America and never immigrated anywhere (except possibly to Spain), and even though the United States did not exist as a nation during his 15th-century voyage. The mythologizing, carried out over many decades, granted Italian-Americans “a formative role in the nation-building narrative.” It also tied Italian-Americans closely to the paternalistic assertion, still heard today, that Columbus “discovered” a continent that was already inhabited by Native Americans.

The “Monument to the Immigrant,” commissioned by the Italian American Marching Club of New Orleans, stands along the Mississippi River in Woldenberg Park.William Widmer for The New York Times

But in the late 19th century, the full-blown Columbus myth was yet to come. The New Orleans lynching solidified a defamatory view of Italians generally, and Sicilians in particular, as irredeemable criminals who represented a danger to the nation. The influential anti-immigrant racist Representative Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, soon to join the United States Senate, quickly appropriated the event. He argued that a lack of confidence in juries, not mob violence, had been the real problem in New Orleans. “Lawlessness and lynching are evil things,” he wrote, “but a popular belief that juries cannot be trusted is even worse.”

Facts aside, Lodge argued, beliefs about immigrants were in themselves sufficient to warrant higher barriers to immigration. Congress ratified that notion during the 1920s, curtailing Italian immigration on racial grounds, even though Italians were legally white, with all of the rights whiteness entailed.

The Italian-Americans who labored in the campaign that overturned racist immigration restrictions in 1965 used the romantic fictions built up around Columbus to political advantage. This shows yet again how racial categories that people mistakenly view as matters of biology grow out of highly politicized myth making.