projection fate

 

aging projection

Коэффициент демографической нагрузки пожилыми в разных странах мира: сейчас и в 2050

В среднем по миру, на 100 людей трудоспособного возраста приходится 16 пожилых (в возрасте 65+), но по странам картина меняется очень сильно

В Японии сейчас на 100 трудоспособных приходится 54.5 пожилых, а к 2050 году, по прогнозам, этот показатель вырастет до... 80.7! И если и текущая ситуация близка к катастрофе, то что будет в 2050 даже страшно подумать

В Германии, Италии и Франции этот показатель сейчас составляет около 40, к 2050 он будет в диапазоне от 54.5 во Франции до 74.4 в Италии (что тоже вполне себе катастрофично)

В Китае к 2050 демографическая нагрузка пожилыми окажется выше, чем в США и Канаде, и немногим ниже, чем сейчас в Японии. Здоровые числа из представленных стран к 2050 останутся только в Индии

У нас сейчас, по расчётам из свежей статьи, этот показатель - порядка 25 пожилых на 100 работоспособных, ко второй половине века он может вырасти до 60 в зависимости от сценария (в среднем - до 40)

Future fears:

societal pessimism and fertility choices

July 15, 2024 Katya Ivanova and Nicoletta Balbo

Katya Ivanova and Nicoletta Balbo examine the link between societal pessimism and fertility decisions. Using prospective data from the Dutch LISS panel, the authors illustrate that broader concerns about the future of the next generation can deter young adults from entering parenthood.

“I do not dare to bring a child into this world” [Op deze wereld durf ik geen kind te zetten] stated the title of a newspaper article in the Netherlands, at the end of 2021. This sentiment is not an isolated occurrence: titles such as “Given the state of the world, is it irresponsible to have kids”, “The rise and rise of the birth strike”, and “Should I have children? Weighing parenthood amid the climate crisis” have been appearing regularly in news outlets over the past decade. The question of why people choose (not) to have children has never been merely academic. Currently, about half of the world’s population lives in countries with sub-replacement fertility levels. The undeniable impact of declining fertility rates on the sustainability of (Western) welfare states has made this issue a critical area for policymaking. Numerous policy analyses have sought to identify effective strategies for encouraging people to have more children (see Sobotka, Matysiak & Brzozowska 2020). Yet, fertility rates continue to fall, even in countries like Finland and Norway, which have made significant, sustained investments in creating conditions that facilitate the combination of work and family life equitably for both partners. Why?

Societal pessimism and fertility

In a recently published study (Ivanova & Balbo 2024), we pointed to one potential culprit: societal pessimism, or the general feeling that things are not moving in the right direction in society at large. Over recent decades, fear and discontent have increasingly become prominent traits of Western societies. Previous efforts to understand the consequences of societal pessimism have concentrated on its potential to affect attitudes toward out-group members such as migrants, as well as political preferences and voting behaviors, particularly in support of populist parties. We argue that societal pessimism can also influence demographic behaviors, such as fertility. People generally expect their children to fare better than, or at least as well as, themselves. Therefore, especially in contexts where voluntary childlessness is becoming more socially acceptable (for example, the Netherlands; Noordhuizen, de Graaf & Sieben 2010), the perceived conditions that the next generation may face – conditions that individuals feel they cannot directly improve – might significantly shape fertility decisions.

Societal pessimism or pessimism about own future?

To determine whether societal pessimism influences fertility behaviors, we first need to understand if people indeed differentiate between their personal futures and the broader future of the next generation. We utilized the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS), a panel created in 2010. When joining the panel, all respondents evaluate various aspects of life (e.g., social relationships, financial prospects, and overall well-being) and, with a 7-point scale, they state whether, in their opinion, the future of the next generation will be significantly better (=1) or worse (=7) than today in each of those areas.

To ascertain by how much people distinguish between the future of the next generation and their own, we carried out additional data collection in 2020. At that point, respondents were asked the original questions plus the same questions but with an explicit focus on their own future. We found that our respondents were more optimistic about their own future than about that of others, specifically the next generation (Figure 1). This aligns with empirical research showing that individuals tend to be more optimistic about their own chances of success and happiness than those of generalized others, a phenomenon known as the ‘optimistic bias’, ‘unrealistic optimism’, and the ‘optimism gap’ (Whitman 1998).

Does societal pessimism matter for the transition to parenthood?

For our study, we focused on adults who were not parents at entry into the LISS panel (when they filled out the societal pessimism measure) but were still relatively young (less than 40 and 45 years old, respectively, for women and men). We “followed” these individuals from their entry into the panel (as early as 2010) until they became parents, dropped out, reached the age of 45 for women and 50 for men, or until the end of observation (2022). Figure 2 displays the predicted probability of becoming a parent, across self-reported societal pessimism scores. What we found is that those who scored higher on societal pessimism were less likely to have a child, even accounting for the level of depression and satisfaction with own income (at the time when they entered LISS).

Why does it matter?

The newspaper headlines mentioned at the start of this article suggest that young adults actively consider the general state of the world when deciding whether to have children. However, these narratives are often captured at a single moment in time. This limitation prevents us from confirming whether these sentiments actually influence behavior. Additionally, it provides detractors with an opportunity to dismiss these narratives, arguing that intentions change as people age. Our findings show that in a society where opting not to have children is increasingly seen as acceptable, the transition to parenthood is indeed influenced by the perception of the world those children would live in.

We do not imply that the imagined future of the next generation is the sole driver of declining fertility rates across the Global North. Undoubtedly, improving the current living conditions of young adults is paramount if countries are interested in reversing this trend. At the same time, it is essential to recognize that even when individuals feel secure about their own future, they might decide to forego parenthood in a world characterized by climate change, increasing inequality, and social polarization.

References

• Ivanova, K. & Balbo, N. (2024). Societal pessimism and the transition to parenthood: A future too bleak to have children? Population and Development Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12620
• Noordhuizen, S., de Graaf, P., & Sieben, I. (2010). The public acceptance of voluntary childlessness in the Netherlands: From 20 to 90 per cent in 30 years. Social Indicators Research, 99, 163-181. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-010-9574-y
• Sobotka, T., Matysiak, A., & Brzozowska, Z. (2020). Policy responses to low fertility: How effective are they? (Working Paper No. 1). UNFPA, Technical Division, Population & Development Branch.
• Whitman, D. (1998). The optimism gap: The I’m OK-They’re Not syndrome and the myth of American decline (1st ed.). Walker & Co

The Storm Gets Even More Perfect

Demographic Prospects for Russia in the Next Decade.

Originally published in Russian: Абылкаликов, С. Демографические перспективы России в ближайшее десятилетие: шторм становится еще идеальнее // Аист на крыше. Демографический журнал. – 2023. – № 10(10). – С. 2-5. https://www.elibrary.ru/download/elibrary_50353411_41191232.pdf

The prospects for the demographic and socioeconomic development of Russia in the next decade were viewed as highly unfavorable, particularly with the onset of the special military operation. Negative trends included shifts in the age structure, a reduction in migration growth, economic stagnation, international isolation, an increase in technological backwardness, and the simplification of the economy's structure. 

Happy New Year!

As the new year dawns, what are the themes and trends to watch? Our annual publication, The World Ahead, considers the outlook across politics, business, technology and culture. Our journalists, joined by guest writers, provide a range of predictions, analysis and insights to prepare you for the next 12 months. Here are some of the ideas that we think should be on your radar.

Tom Standage
Deputy editor, The Economist, and editor, The World Ahead 2024

thinking

Социологи спрогнозировали будущее правительство Германии на фоне требований досрочных выборов

[как мне не нравится слово спрогнозировали, но ничего не попишешь]

В последнее время всё больше политиков Германии требуют провести досрочные выборы в Бундестаг, не дожидаясь осени 2025 года. Сначала с таким призывом выступил премьер-министр Баварии и лидер партии ХСС Маркус Зёдер. Недавно о том же заявила депутат Бундестага Сара Вагенкнехт, создающая собственную партию.

Специально для BILD социологический институт INSA провёл опрос о том, каким граждане хотели бы видеть новое коалиционное правительство Германии. Большинство участников (26%) считают, что его должен возглавить консервативный блок ХДС/ХСС, 14% — правящая Социал-демократическая партия Германии (СДПГ), 13% — ультраправая «Альтернатива для Германии». Как считают социологи, сейчас наиболее вероятно формирование новой «большой коалиции» из крупнейших партий — ХДС/ХСС и СДПГ. Именно они правили вместе в 2005-2009 и 2013-2021 гг.

Что касается непосредственной поддержки каждой из партий, то наиболее популярны находящиеся в оппозиции консерваторы (30%, на графике) и ультраправые (22%). Совокупный рейтинг СДПГ, «Зелёных» и СвДП, составляющих правящую коалицию, составляет лишь 35%.

@BILD_Russian

our future

Главные характеристики при выборе ВУЗа молодёжью

Интересная таблица из свежего исследования (выборка: студенты 1 курса Волгоградского государственного технического университета) о критериях выбора ВУЗа студентами. Важнее всего для молодёжи при выборе места для получения высшего образования оказалось наличие интересующей специальности, перспективы профессии, гарантия трудоустройства, надёжность и отзывы о ВУЗе.

Меньше всего внимания обращают на мнению родственников, рекламу и статус НИУ! Последнее, конечно, может быть вызвано особенностями выборки, но всё равно очень забавный результат с учётом того, сколько ресурсов у нас вкладывается в национальные исследовательские университеты (ну, на фоне других ВУЗов...)

population maximum soon

тыцабельно

Когда население мира достигнет своего пика

По всем оценкам - где-то во второй половине этого века! Оценки варьируются от 2064 года до 2086, а население мира на пике не слишком сильно превысит текущие цифры: оценки лежат в диапазоне от 9.4 до 10.4 миллиардов человек

Measuring population health in Moldova: health expectancies

тыцабельно

Health measures are decisive for the development and implementation of population health policies. Monitoring health indicators can lead to improvements in health and decrease in the inequalities among subpopulations. The life expectancy at birth for the Moldovan population did not increase considerably during the last decades, due to the social and economic crisis which led to high mortality and poor health. In Moldova, no aggregated health indicators are utilized for health monitoring. Therefore, the authors calculated health indicators to assess the population health and argue their importance. Mortality and subjective data on self-perxceived health and self-rated morbidity from the Household Budget Survey was used for constructing period morbidity-mortality tables. Thus, the authors applied Sullivan’s method to calculate the life expectancy in very good/good/fair health and the life expectancy without chronic morbidity for the period 2006–2015. The life expectancies in very good/good/fair health showed a compres-sion of morbidity in the older ages for both sexes, and for rural and urban types of residence. The life expectancies without chronic morbidity for males and for urban dwellers demonstrated an expansion of morbidity. Although the life expectancy is slowly increasing, the trends in population health are contradictory, depending on the applied measures. The health expectancy indicators, based on self-perceived health, depict the actual situation in the population health. These indicators are becoming more essenti al with the ageing process and can be used for the tailoring of social and health policies and services to the real needs of the population

Source

Workshop on Small Area Population Forecasting Methods

24th October 2023

A workshop on small area population forecasting methods reporting many of the findings of the Australian Research Council-funded project ‘Developing Robust Small Area Population Forecasts for Planning and Policy’ will be held in Melbourne on 24th October. The workshop will include:

- Simple models for small area age-sex population forecasts

- Small area forecasting with machine learning

- Probabilistic small area population forecasts

- Launch of new SA3 area population forecasts for Australia

- Keynote address by Dr Kim Johnstone 'When population forecasts and planning meet'

- Q & A session.

Morning tea, lunch, and afternoon tea will be provided. The workshop is free but registration is essential. Places are limited. For further details and registration please see the Eventbrite webpage

Small Area Population Forecasting Methods

eventbrite.com.au

The new Asian family

East Asian governments must try to manage a momentous social change they cannot prevent

насколько мы востчные? думаю: да, география мало что меняет

The concept of “Asian values”, once championed by leaders across the region, went out of vogue after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The idea that East and South-East Asia’s disciplined governments had a unique economic edge over the decadent West suddenly seemed less compelling. Today in prosperous East Asia a different facet of those ballyhooed values is looking even more parlous. In China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Asians’ supposed commitment to conservative family life is collapsing. As we report in our Asia and China sections this week, millions of young people are opting for looser, often lonelier and—in the East Asian context—less male-dominated arrangements. In a region that is home to over a fifth of humanity, the socioeconomic and demographic consequences will be vast, potentially destabilising and will shape millions of lives.

In Japan, where the shift first became evident, married couples with at least one child accounted for 42% of households in 1980, and single people 20%. That has flipped. In 2020 couples with children accounted for 25% of households, and singletons 38%. And the decline is continuing. Last year 17% of Japanese men and 15% of women aged 18-34 said they would not marry, up from 2% and 4% in the early 1980s, and China recorded its lowest-ever number of marriages, half as many as a decade ago.

In some ways young Chinese, Japanese, Taiwanese and South Koreans are following a path charted in rich countries elsewhere. Between 1960 and 2010 Europe’s marriage rate fell by half, for many of the reasons that are now driving down East Asian rates. To many people, marriage seems increasingly anachronistic and unaffordable. Across East Asia it is still widely understood in Confucian terms, as the union of a dominant man and submissive woman. In South Korea a married woman is referred to as Jip-saram, or “home person”, and her husband as Bakat-yangban, or “man outside”.

High property prices are an added disincentive to setting up a marital home. Alternative domestic arrangements are becoming more accepted; besides singledom, they include intergenerational flat-sharing and, less often, cohabiting and gay partnerships. And growing numbers of middle-class women are putting off marriage to concentrate on their careers.

Traditional values are hard on women at work, too. East Asia has some of the world’s best-educated women, yet its overall record on female empowerment is poor and in some ways worsening. On the World Economic Forum’s gender-equality ranking of 153 countries, China—where women are said to “hold up half the sky”—slipped from 63rd in 2006 to 102nd in 2022. South Korea has the widest gender pay gap in the oecd.

If most of this sounds familiar, two things make East Asia’s great social change distinct and hugely troublesome. First, the taboo against having children outside marriage remains as rigid as ever. Across the oecd, 40% of births are outside wedlock. In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan less than 5% are. (The figure in China is unavailable, revealingly, but not thought to be higher.)

The result is a plummeting fertility rate. South Korea’s, at 0.78, is the lowest recorded anywhere and Taiwan’s only slightly higher. Japan’s and China’s are just above half the replacement rate. China’s cruel one-child policy, now replaced by panicked officials with calls to have three, exacerbated its demographic squeeze. But as the regional picture shows, it would have happened anyway. The total population of the four East Asian countries is predicted to shrink by 28% between 2020 and 2075.

The second problem is that the region’s governments are making the situation worse. None seriously broaches the only policy guaranteed to revive East Asia’s flagging demography: mass immigration. Their main response is to try to resuscitate marriage with economic perks—including tax breaks and subsidised weddings—with little success. South Korea’s president, Yoon Suk-yeol, admits that his country has, in essence, squandered 280trn won ($215bn) on such policies. Worse, he and his counterparts in China and Japan are doubling down on the conservative approach that their citizens increasingly object to.

South Korea’s previous administration sought to extend benefits to single parents and unmarried couples. Mr Yoon, who blames the low fertility rate on feminism, has put a stop to that. Under Xi Jinping, China promises its citizens a Confucian revival and arrests gay-rights activists. Japan’s ever-ruling Liberal Democratic Party is also against reforming marriage, including by refusing to make it available to gay couples, although most voters want to see that change.

There are pockets of progress, notably in Taiwan, which recently took a more liberal course. It has legalised same-sex marriage and in May permitted gay couples to adopt children—though it is too soon to know whether these changes will show up in the statistics. But the region as a whole is stuck between modernity and tradition, suffering some of the worst effects of both. East Asians are free to disdain traditional family roles, but not to redefine them. That is why millions resort to childlessness and solitude.

Governments should try to complete this lopsided revolution. Even if social change is not entirely within their grasp, and does not happen overnight, they can at least stop resisting it. To make family life more attractive, they need to deal with its gender imbalances as well as its costs by, for example, making paternity leave routine. They should look beyond heterosexual marriage, as their citizens have, and extend legal recognition to cohabiting, gay and other non-traditional arrangements—and afford them the support married couples now enjoy, especially over child-rearing. It is self-defeating and outrageous that China prevents single women from freezing their eggs, or that Japan makes it nearly impossible for gay couples to foster children.

Let them not wed

Such policies would not fix the region’s demography. But they would have a more positive effect on it than the current ones. More important, they would leave millions freer to lead the lives they choose, especially women and gay people. East Asian governments have overseen the greatest-ever economic boom. Now they must attend to their citizens’ happiness and liberty. ■

For subscribers only: to see how we design each week’s cover, sign up to our weekly Cover Story newsletter.

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "The new Asian family"

kids are our future

Выпускники школ в этом году чаще всего будут подавать документы на факультеты, связанные с IT и медициной

Дети стали чаще прощаться со школой после 9 класса и уходить в колледжи и училища, об этом рассказали 29% родителей — больше, чем когда-либо. При этом и абитуриенты университетов, и поступающие в средние профессиональные учебные заведения чаще всего выбирают профессии в IT и медицине. В опросе сервиса по поиску высокооплачиваемой работы SuperJob приняли участие 2000 родителей выпускников из всех округов страны.

О том, что после окончания школы их ребенок намерен продолжить обучение в вузе, сообщили 45% родителей. О том, что ребенок собирается поступить в среднее учебное заведение, родители в этом году говорят чаще, чем когда-либо: поступить в училище или колледж собираются дети 29% опрошенных. О готовности ребенка пойти работать сразу после выпускного бала рассказал 1% родителей.

Среди абитуриентов вузов самая популярная сфера в 2023 году — информационные технологии: «войти в IT» собираются дети 28% опрошенных. На втором месте — врач (13%), на третьем — инженер (9%). Дети 6% респондентов готовятся к поступлению на экономиста. По 4% родителей рассказали о планах ребенка получить профессии юриста, дизайнера, архитектора и тренера.

Те, кто поступает в средние учебные заведения, тоже чаще всего делают выбор в пользу IT-специальностей: о подобных намерениях детей рассказал каждый четвертый опрошенный (25%). У каждого девятого (11%) ребенок собирается учиться на медсестру, медбрата или фельдшера, у 8% — на юриста, по 7% сообщили о планах детей получить специальность учителя, строителя, автомеханика и квалифицированного рабочего.

Хотите, чтобы ваши дети стали успешными и как можно раньше выбрали сферу деятельности, — обращайтесь к экспертам профориентации SuperJob. Мы поможем определиться с выбором профессионального пути и подскажем школьникам, куда поступать.

Место проведения опроса: Россия, все округа
Населенных пунктов: 358
Время проведения: 10 апреля — 10 мая 2023 года
Исследуемая совокупность: родители детей, заканчивающих школу в этом году
Размер выборки: 2000 респондентов

Подробнее

Дети — наше неизвестное будущее

Who’s Predicted To Win Eurovision 2023?

The finals of the 67th [страшно подумать: я — практически ровесник этого, так долго не живут] Eurovision Song Contest will take place in Liverpool, in the United Kingdom, on May 13. The UK, which came second in last year’s competition, is hosting Eurovision on behalf of Ukraine, which had secured first place in 2022 with the song "Stefania", but due to the Russian invasion would not have been able to host it.

After two semi-final events this week, the number of competitors has dropped from 37 to 26, and as our chart shows, as of May 11, bookies have a clear favorite to win.

With a probability of 49 percent, Sweden’s Loreen is expected to take first place this year with her understated, modern pop song "Tattoo." The forecast is based on an evaluation of the average odds of 17 betting portals analyzed by the Eurovisionworld portal [хороший пример: будущее неизвестно, в этом прелесть]. Meanwhile, Finland has a 20 percent chance of winning this year according to the site with musician Käärijä's contribution of "Cha Cha Cha", which relies on bass-heavy EDM accompanied by underlying rock guitars. Where last year's entry from Ukraine was rated with a 62 percent chance of winning, this year the bookmakers only see a seven percent chance of Tvorchi's "Heart of Steel" taking home the title.

Although the differences seem drastic at first glance, bookmakers have not always gotten it right in the past. In the seven competitions between 2015 and 2022, participants with the second or third highest odds of winning won first place three times.

migration.ru prospects

Сообщаем, что очередное заседание Демографической секции Центрального Дома ученых РАН, пройдет в четверг 27 апреля 2023 года в Зеленой гостиной ( 2 этаж).

Тема доклада: 

Об отдельных аспектах миграции в современной России
(Положение новых российских эмигрантов: намерения и перспективы возвращения)

Доклад: 

Борусяк Любовь Фридриховны — в.н.с. лаборатории социокультурных образовательных программ МГУ им. М.В. Ломоносова

Начало в 18.30

Заседание пройдет в очном формате!

estimated population

Пока Россия несет потери на войне, демографы посчитали: для сохранения населения страны нужно до 1 млн мигрантов ежегодно

Для сохранения численности российского населения на уровне 146 млн человек, страна должна привлечь от 390 тысяч мигрантов до 1,1 млн в год ежегодно на протяжении 80 лет, сообщает РБК со ссылкой на экспертов Института демографии им. А.Г. Вишневского НИУ ВШЭ.

В 2022 году численность населения России упала на 533 тыс. человек, по последним данным Росстата, сейчас в стране живет 146,45 млн человек. Снижение численности населения будет продолжаться, считают эксперты: к 2070 году – до 131 млн человек.

Если рождаемость будет до 2,5 ребенка на одну женщину, а продолжительность жизни вырастет до 85,7 года у мужчин и 90,5 года у женщин, то миграционный прирост в 2100 году увеличится на 430 тысяч человек ежегодно.

Но если рождаемость снизится до 1,4 ребенка на одну женщину, к концу века миграционный прирост сократится до 60 тысяч человек. [что-то напутано]

Демографы обеспокоены и убеждены, что даже при самых благоприятных сценариях ожидается [ожидается] снижение численности населения.

Би-би-си с "Медиазоной" (признана минюстом "иноагентом") и командой волонтеров ведут списки погибших российских военных на войне в Украине. На 7 апреля известно о почти 20 000 погибших. Картина отражает лишь частично все потери российской армии. Кроме этого неизвестно, сколько всего раненых, пропавших без вести и попавших в плен.

China’s first population fall since 1961 creates ‘bleaker’ outlook for country

Shift occurring nearly a decade ahead of forecasts heightens concerns over demographic time bomb

 

A woman holds a baby at a local park in Beijing, China. China’s population has shrunk for the first time since 1961.

Helen Davidson in Taipei and agencies Tue 17 Jan 2023

China has entered an “era of negative population growth”, after figures revealed a historic drop in the number of people for the first time since 1961.

The country had 1.41175 billion people at the end of 2022, compared with 1.41260 billion a year earlier, the National Bureau of Statistics said on Tuesday, a drop of 850,000. It marked the beginning of what is expected to be a long period of population decline, despite major government efforts to reverse the trend.

Speaking on the eve of the data’s release, Cai Fang, vice-chairman of the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, said China’s population had reached its peak in 2022, much earlier than expected. “Experts in the fields of population and economics have predicted that by 2022 or no later than 2023, my country will enter an era of negative population growth,” Cai said.

China’s government has for several years been scrambling to encourage people to have more children, and stave off the looming demographic crisis caused by an ageing population. New policies have sought to ease the financial and social burdens of child rearing, or to actively incentivise having children via subsidies and tax breaks. Some provinces or cities have announced cash payments to parents who have a second or third child. Last week the city of Shenzhen announced financial incentives that translate into a total of 37,500 yuan ($5,550) for a three-child family.

However after decades of a one-child policy that punitively discouraged having multiple children, and rising costs of modern living, resistance remains among couples.

At a press conference on Tuesday, Kang Yi, head of the National Bureau of Statistics, said China’s overall labor supply still exceeded demand, and people should not worry about the population decline.

China is on track to be overtaken by India as the world’s most populous nation.

Last year’s birthrate was 6.77 births per 1,000 people, down from a rate of 7.52 births in 2021, marking the lowest birthrate on record. In real numbers, there were more than one million fewer registered births in 2022 than the previous year’s total of 10.62 million.

The country also logged its highest death rate since 1976, registering 7.37 deaths per 1,000 people compared with a rate of 7.18 deaths in 2021.

Cai said China’s social policies needed to be adjusted, including aged care and pensions, a national financial burden which would worsen in the future and impact China’s economic growth.

Online, some Chinese people were unsurprised by the announcement, saying the social pressures which were driving the low birthrate still remained.

“Housing prices, welfare, education, healthcare – reasons why people can’t afford to have children,” said one commenter on Weibo.

“Now who dares to have children, housing prices are so expensive, no one wants to get married and even fall in love, let alone have children,” said another.

“Not talking about raising social security, only talking about raising the fertility rate, it’s all just crap.”

On Tuesday China’s government also announced the GDP had grown 3% in 2022. That figure would mark one of the slowest periods of growth in decades, but was still higher than predicted, prompting some scepticism among analysts given the incredibly stringent zero-Covid658шг restrictions in place during the fourth quarter.

China’s stringent zero-Covid policies that were in place for three years before an abrupt reversal which has overwhelmed medical facilities, have caused further damage to the country’s bleak demographic outlook, population experts have said.

Yi Fuxian, an obstetrics and gynaecology researcher at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and expert on China’s population changes, said the decline in population was occurring almost a decade earlier than the country’s government and the United Nations had projected.

“Meaning that China’s real demographic crisis is beyond imagination and that all of China’s past economic, social, defence, and foreign policies were based on faulty demographic data,” Yi said on Twitter.

“China’s demographic and economic outlook is much bleaker than expected. China will have to undergo a strategic contraction and adjust its social, economic, defence, and foreign policies. China will improve relations with the West.”

India faces deepening demographic divide as it prepares to overtake China as the world’s most populous country

HIV economics

Пациентам с ВИЧ отказали в дополнительных средствах на закупку АРВ-препаратов

София Прохорчук 2 ноября 2022

Минфин России счел нецелесообразным выделять дополнительное финансирование на закупку антиретровирусных (АРВ) препаратов на 2023–2025 годы, так как средств, направленных Минздраву из федбюджета на эти цели, достаточно (в Минздраве с этим тезисом согласны). В «Пациентском контроле», представляющем интересы людей с ВИЧ-инфекцией и другими социально значимыми заболеваниями, считают иначе: в октябре организация просила Правительство РФ предусмотреть на закупку АРВ-препаратов дополнительные 15 млрд рублей. Обращение пациентов было перенаправлено в Минфин.

Департамент бюджетной политики в отраслях социальной сферы и науки Минфина в ответ на обращение пациентской организации сообщил, что на лекобеспечение пациентов с ВИЧ-инфекцией, в том числе в сочетании с гепатитами B и С, на 2023–2025 годы выделено 95,1 млрд рублей, то есть по 31,7 млрд рублей ежегодно. В ведомстве считают, что этих средств достаточно для реализации мероприятий по достижению необходимого охвата профильных пациентов АРВ-терапией.

В Минздраве в ответ на обращение «Пациентского контроля» [НКО, судя по всему] заявили, что, согласно Стратегии противодействия ВИЧ до 2030 года, утвержденной правительством, финансирование закупок препаратов осуществляется не только за счет средств федбюджета, но и за за счет бюджетов регионов и иных источников финансирования.

В октябре 2022 года представители «Пациентского контроля» направили письмо в Правительство России с просьбой увеличить финансирование закупок АРВ-препаратов на 2023–2025 годы на 15 млрд рублей. Необходимость увеличения финансирования в пациентской организации мотивировали тем, что расходы из федерального и региональных бюджетов в 2020–2022 годах на АРВ-препараты оставались «практически на одном уровне, несмотря на рост количества новых случаев и количества пациентов». [это прогноз потребности в ВААРТ, которым у нас не владеет практически никто, даже ВААРТ и потребность в нём минздравом не определены]

Общая сумма затрат на все закупки АРВ‑препаратов в России в 2021 году составила 31,69 млрд рублей. В «Пациентском контроле» отметили, что по сравнению с 2020 годом бюджет централизованных закупок увеличился на 2,88 млрд рублей, однако «формально», так как 1,36 млрд рублей пришлись на закупки для ФСИН, которые в 2020 году не входили в общую сумму закупок Минздрава.

В 2022 году Минздрав производил централизованные закупки после исчерпания бюджета на препараты на текущий год за счет средств, предназначенных на 2023 год. Ведомство потратило 8,6 млрд рублей из бюджета на следующий год, что говорит о возросшей по сравнению с прошлым годом потребности в АРВ-препаратах. Пациенты с ВИЧ-инфекцией опасаются, что бюджет на 2023 год может исчерпаться раньше времени, что приведет к усугублению ситуации с их лекобеспечением.

Putin misjudged Ukraine

Is the West falling into a similar trap with Russia and China?

A good way to start the New Year: The New York Times and Washington Post have run excellent post mortems on why Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has been a disaster so far. The larger question, however, is whether this failed invasion was a surprise. Many countries, particularly the United States, have blundered in using force and starting wars, assuming that its formidable military could not fail.

Why should Russia be immune to similar misjudgments?

Fully understanding Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decisionmaking must be circumstantial. But consider his likely thought process, ironically paralleling that of several American presidents in deciding to go to war. In late 2021, Putin may have been ambivalent about launching a “special military operation (SMO).” But he probably thought his two options were “win-win.”

Either the U.S., NATO and the EU could accept his “demands” for a new strategic framework in Europe, limiting NATO’s expansion eastand preventing Ukraine from joining the alliance. Or, if the allies refused, having already deployed his forces on Ukraine’s borders in a so-called training exercise, an invasion would lead to a quick rout of Ukraine’s forces in the dash to seize Kyiv and other key cities. That the U.S. and NATO immediately rejected even discussion of Putin’s demands infuriated the Russian and likely provoked the decision to invade Ukraine.

After all, how could Russia not succeed? It had modernized its military, organizing its forces into self-contained Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) equipped with weapons proven in battle in Syria and elsewhere. With a relatively small force of about 5,000 and a handful of Kalibr cruise missiles, Russia had saved Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria. It had learned from its bungled South Ossetia operation in 2008 and taken Crimea peacefully in 2014 with “little green men.”

Thus, from Putin’s perspective, while a “slam dunk” was never inevitable, this SMO was not far from that. Yet, so far, the Ukraine war has been Putin’s worst nightmare. Whether Russia can reverse the state of the war with a more competent general in charge and mount a new offensive remain to be seen. But Putin’s errors were not unique to Russia.

America’s defeats in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq after 2003 should have been warnings to Putin. They don’t seem to have been. First, all three wars were deemed in America’s vital interests when they were not. Second, American presidents were overly confident about the capability of their militaries, from President Lyndon Johnson’s order “to nail that coonskin to the wall” to George W. Bush’s “combat operations” in Iraq are over and we “have prevailed.”

Third, the U.S. was grossly wrong in estimating the ability of the enemy to respond and endure as the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese and, later, the Taliban did. After Saddam Hussein’s army was eviscerated in “Iraqi Freedom” in 2003, the Bush administration failed to anticipate the following insurgency. Putin has ignored these lessons.

Putin’s current strategy is to “win by not losing.” His obscene bombing campaign to destroy Ukraine’s power, water and food infrastructure is meant to force Kyiv to capitulate or to accept terms favorable to Moscow. Meanwhile, Russia is rebuilding and restoring a badly mauled army. Ukraine continues to mobilize and train hundreds of thousands of troops to defeat any Russian offensive and recapture as much of the occupied territories as possible.

Predicting how this war ends is what former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called an “unknown unknown.” But deadlock appears among the more likely outcomes. And, as the U.S. persisted in Vietnam for well over a decade, Afghanistan for two decades and still has some forces in Iraq, Russia could be following a similar track.

One conclusion is clear: Without full knowledge and understanding of the conditions in which force is to be used, failure may not be inevitable, but it is extremely likely. Have the U.S. and NATO taken this axiom to heart in thinking through both future strategy and the forces needed for successful execution of that strategy in dealing with the Ukrainian war? Russia did not.

Money is not the answer. Despite an $858 billion U.S. defense budget, how knowledgeable are U.S. senior political civilian and military officials on the strengths and weaknesses of China and Russia, their strategies, leaderships and overall competence to achieve strategic aims? Indeed, is it possible that China’s military prowess has been as exaggerated as Russia’s?

Putin and his generals were flagrantly ignorant about Ukraine. Is the West falling into a similar trap regarding China and Russia? Answering that question is vital.

Harlan Ullman is senior adviser at the Atlantic Council and the prime author of “shock and awe.” His latest book is “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large.” Follow him on Twitter @harlankullman.

While Optimism Wavers For 2023, Hope Still Wins Out

While global optimism for 2023 has dropped, despite everything, the world is still on average holding out more hope than not. According to the latest data from Ipsos, a global average of 65 percent of respondents say they feel optimistic that 2023 will be better than 2022. Yet, as our chart shows, that’s down 12 percentage points from last year and the lowest score recorded since Ipsos started running the survey.

Of course, a global average as a single figure hides the differences between countries. For instance, when looking at an international breakdown, Brazil has a relatively high share of people feeling positive about the coming year. Out of the 32 countries polled, it comes out on top, with 85 percent of respondents feeling more optimistic about 2023 than 2022. This has risen slightly from last year when 82 percent of respondents said they felt optimistic looking ahead.

At the opposite end of the spectrum stands Japan. The country has only 36 percent of its respondents feeling more positive about next year, which is an 18 percentage point drop from one year before. This is supported by a similar survey carried out earlier this year by Nippon, which similarly found that respondents, especially the younger generation, felt little hope that their country was set to improve anytime soon, partly due to the country having entered an era of declining population and low economic growth.

The UK has a more equal split. Where a total of 87 percent of Britons considered 2022 to be a particularly bad year for the country, over 80 percent of respondents also said it’s likely prices will increase faster than people’s incomes next year, that inflation will be higher in 2023 than 2022, and that interest rates will grow further still.

Is population growth over?

Is population growth over?
NOPE!#8BillionAndCountinghttps://t.co/uHeMMFPxmG pic.twitter.com/JRgtqxhwFn

— Population Matters (@PopnMatters) December 31, 2022