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История России и возрастно-половая структура населения, часть 1

отклики телеграмма на демографическую политику

Ну вот такое, например. Оговорки и уточнения:

1) работать с возрастно-половой пирамидой as is невозможно, потому что после неудач переписи 2021 года оказалась сильно завышена численность поколений, родившихся в круглые годы (1960, 1965, 1970...). Или с апреля 1979 по март 1980 гг. советские люди усиленно любили друг друга и в итоге родили на 10% больше детей, чем на год раньше или на год позже, или всё-таки со статистикой что-то не так. Для устранения возрастной аккумуляции пирамида сглажена методом скользящего среднего. Метод простой, рабоче-крестьянский и привёл к некоторым искажениям в старших и младших возрастах, но наглядности диаграммы это, кажется, сильно не повредило;

2) строго говоря, в России ещё живут примерно несколько десятков людей, которые родились до октября 1917 г., но показать их в масштабе диаграммы совершенно невозможно, да и точная численность этой группы неизвестна (подробнее см. на Global Supercentenarian Forum). Для протокола отметим, что есть ещё россияне, рождённые при Николае II, князе Львове и Александре Керенском — на диаграмме они объединены с рождёнными при Ленине;

3) конечно, не все россияне родились в России и при российских/советских главах государства: кто-то при Кучме, кто-то при Назарбаеве, кто-то при Рахмоне, а кто-то из сахалинских корейцев — и при императоре Хирохито. Было бы здорово это тоже показать, но у меня таких данных нет, поэтому я размечаю пирамиду сугубо по хронологии российских и советских руководителей;

4) кстати о хронологии — она наверняка вызовет у некоторых читателей вопросы, особенно в части 1953 и 1991 гг. Упреждая возможную дискуссию: я художник, я так вижу. В реальности высшая государственная власть в указанные периоды не может быть однозначно атрибутирована одному человеку, скорее речь идёт о дуумвирате или даже триумвирате (март — июнь 1953), поэтому проставлены условные отсечки;

5) при оценке принимается допущение, что в пределах одного года рождения люди распределены равномерно, хотя это неправда: максимум рождений приходится на летние месяцы, а в пожилых возрастах родившиеся в конце года будут несколько многочисленнее, чем родившиеся в начале, из-за влияния смертности;

6) разумеется, всё это без учёта новых регионов, которых в данных Росстата пока нет.

Crossing the generational divide

what established scientists and early-career researchers can learn from each other

Astrophysicist and Shaw prizewinner Victoria Kaspi describes how science forums can help researchers of all ages to share ideas and career concerns.

By Kamal Nahas

In November, Victoria Kaspi attended the first Hong Kong Laureate Forum, which aims to foster relationships between established researchers and those just starting their career in science.

Victoria Kaspi scans the night sky for X-ray signals in search of clues about astronomical phenomena. The astrophysicist, who is based at McGill University in Montreal, Canada, led the research team that solved the mystery of the source of X-ray pulsars that produce erratic, outbursts that are also brighter than usual. Kaspi and her colleagues discovered that the signals originate from magnetars, highly magnetized neutron stars. The Shaw Prize Foundation awarded Kaspi and astrophysicist Chryssa Kouveliotou at George Washington University in Washington DC the US$1.2-million 2021 Shaw Prize in Astronomy for their work on magnetars. Last month, Kaspi attended the inaugural Hong Kong Laureate Forum alongside early-career researchers and 22 other Shaw laureates. The forum is designed to nurture connections and discussions between researchers at different stages of their careers through panel discussions, talks and social events. Kaspi spoke to Nature about the forum and how it helped to foster communication between different generations of scientists.

Tell us about the conversations you had with early-career researchers at the forum.

I attended a breakfast at which each laureate was assigned to a table with seven or eight undergraduate and graduate students from around the world. At first, they seemed nervous. Everyone looked at each other from around the table and there was a bit of a chasm, but as we went along, the conversations got very animated. I shared my experiences as a researcher and the challenges I faced. They shared their concerns, one of which was how to identify research questions worth exploring. The answer I gave, which other laureates echoed, was that first, they should find something that interests them enough to sustain the focus needed to make progress. Second, they should consider whether their interests are practical and tractable with current technology. In my field, I have to ask myself whether recent or upcoming technological innovations will allow me to observe specific signals in the Universe.

Newcomers to science can perceive the academic career path as complex and hard to manoeuvre, so I thought it was helpful to reflect on my career with them.

You mention your career challenges. What are the biggest hurdles you’ve faced?

Sometimes my laboratory members and I struggled to convince other scientists that we were detecting actual signals in the Universe and not just noise. For instance, we monitored bright X-ray emissions from pulsars for years, but found that this wasn’t telling us much more than we already knew. So one of my graduate students, Fotis Gavriil, tackled the data from a different angle and quantified tiny X-ray bursts that were only slightly above background levels in the night sky. We were reasonably confident that these signals were real, but it was hard to convince the community. We had to stick our necks out, but eventually we showed that these bursts were significant and we published our findings. We were right all along, but it’s easy to doubt yourself.

Which of your discussions at the forum were the most memorable?

We talked about the importance of communicating research to a broad audience. We discussed the fact that effectively communicating science to laypeople, the press, politicians and students is vital for both combating mistrust of science and ensuring funding continues to be provided. It’s not always easy to make science accessible; two of the mathematics students I spoke to had attended mathematics talks at the forum but said that they didn’t really understand them. We talked about how communication can be more of a challenge in some fields, and I contrasted mathematics with astrophysics, in which the subject matter is more amenable to communication with non-specialists. By coincidence, an excellent speaker then came on stage and delivered a talk about his research that resonated with all of us.

We also discussed the importance of meeting scientists abroad. The students came from around the world, and one had never previously left their home country — Brazil, I think. I told them that when your research covers a narrow scope, the experts who can help you might live abroad, and you should seize opportunities to travel and meet them.

Do you notice any differences in attitudes and career goals between early-career scientists and more-senior researchers?

One of the biggest shifts I see between generations is younger workers’ stance on maintaining a good work–life balance. I don’t place any value judgements on that, though. I worked 18 hours a day when I was a student — something I’m not necessarily proud of.

The younger generation tend to do a better job of communicating their work. They ingest unfamiliar information more often and can better appreciate how it feels to not understand something. Exposure to social media might also mean that communication comes more naturally to them. However, some ideas are too complex to be distilled into a meme or conveyed with few words. I think the older generation is more accustomed to longer, more-nuanced ways of communicating. Both groups can learn from each other, which is great.

It’s possible that the younger generation will be less inclined to travel for work now that everybody uses Zoom. They might also be more inclined to raise valid concerns about the carbon footprint of travel, but there really is no substitute for being in the same room as somebody for networking and socializing.

What was the most common question students asked at panel discussions?

There were a lot of conversations about how the Shaw laureates made their big breakthroughs. The key point was that you really have to work at a problem for a long time and not expect instant results. Not every publication has to be a big breakthrough. Often, advances are incremental. I’m candid about the challenges and self-doubt I’ve experienced, thinking, ‘Am I really good enough? Can I really do this?’ I was impressed to hear many of the other Shaw laureates saying the same thing. Maybe winning the Shaw prize gives you the confidence to share your lack of confidence.

What did you learn from younger attendees at the forum?

On a personal level, I learnt how important it is to appreciate my career, seeing all these young students aspiring to become researchers. It’s easy to get mired in the complexities of our work, and my peers and I often forget to be thankful for the opportunity we have to lead rewarding careers that we love. On a professional level, I learnt that students benefit from attending a forum like this one because it is tremendously interdisciplinary, which is rare in the academic landscape. I would absolutely encourage students to attend conferences like this one, should the chance arise.

What advice would you give early-career researchers pursuing academia?

It takes perseverance and tenacity. You pursue academia because you love it and can’t imagine doing anything else. Don’t let a few challenges deter you. That being said, you should find a good mentor and supportive environment to help you through bleak times.

doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-023-04069-0

low fertility

Despite low fertility, Europe still taxes its own reproduction

By Pieter Vanhuysse, Robert Iván Gál & Márton Medgyesi

тыц по кортинко, если охота увидеть оригинал

Over the working life, parents in Europe contribute on average about one-quarter fewer net taxes than non-parents. However, if taxes, private time and money are all taken into account and measured in comparable units, it shows that parents contribute over two-and-a-half times more than non-parents.

As different generations live together, they transfer valuable resources to each other. Newborns are delivered into this world – not by storks but by their mothers; more on this later. Then, it takes on average twenty-five years to turn babies into resource-productive adults. But how many resources does this childrearing process really require? And who pays for it? These are questions of primordial importance as they pertain to demographic renewal and fiscal sustainability – to how societies reproduce over time.

Accounting for the invisible transfer cost of raising children

Parents use a combination of three channels to rear children: (1) staying at home to care for their child (giving “time”), (2) buying market goods and services (giving “money”), or (3) working and paying higher net public transfers (“taxes”) that will finance state activities, including policies for children and families. But importantly, these three channels are not equally visible in statistics. Parents do not keep accounts of how much time and money they spend, but taxes and social security contributions are much better recorded.

In ’Taxing Reproduction’, we argue that this asymmetric statistical visibility matters a great deal, as it hides an important further asymmetry in who shoulders the cost of reproducing society. Better measuring the distributional impact of the status quo allows debates about the social and private costs of demographic renewal to be held on more complete and more explicit terms. We use NTA and NTTA methods for twelve EU countries to measure not just all net public transfers (the “state”) but, crucially, also to value the less visible flows of private time and money.

Shining a wider light changes the picture

A fuller accounting for intergenerational transfers truly shifts perspectives, and not just marginally. We find that parents in Europe contribute somewhat fewer public transfers than non-parents. But, away from the statistical limelight, parents additionally provide large transfers of time and money to their own children. This might seem unremarkable. Parents are, after all, the primary caretakers.

But these hidden extra transfers are so large that they radically change the entire picture. Over the working life, parents in Europe contribute on average about one-quarter fewer net taxes than non-parents. But when we then also value all flows of private time and money, parents turn out to contribute over two-and-a-half times more resources overall.

Why do such large asymmetries in cost-sharing matter? Rearing children is not just a personal lifestyle choice. Children are also public goods. As they grow up to become taxpayers, social security contributors, caregivers and parents in their turn, children will finance future public goods and welfare states. All of this will then also benefit non-parents. Hence childrearing creates positive externalities. To be sure, another part of parental transfers resembles pure consumption. Private transfers may also reduce intergenerational mobility. So why should parents be compensated for something they presumably freely engaged in?

Debunking another “stork theory”

A key reason is that not counting the positive externalities of a good generally leads to socially suboptimal amounts of that good being produced. If societies do not fully value the transfer cost of childrearing, they risk producing too few productive adults. This puts the intergenerational social contract under severe strain. Ultimately, labour markets and welfare states could not continue to function well without the human capabilities of subsequent generations.

Barring immigration on a politically wholly unrealistic scale, the renewal of societies, economies, and welfare states crucially depends on both the size (“quantity”) and the productivity and capabilities (“quality”) of successive generations – on what mainly parents do. This is why childrearing acquires the deeper status of producing, also, a socially necessary public good.

Today, policy practices do not fully take into account how the human and fiscal resources welfare states and labour markets tap into were created in the first place. Societies thus adhere to another “stork theory” that needs debunking. Just as newborn infants are not actually delivered by storks, resource-productive adults do not just drop fully formed out of the sky. Rather, they are delivered to society after a further twenty-five years of child-rearing, financed to some degree by all taxpayers but to a larger degree by their own parents.

Ageing Europe taxes its own reproduction

Many activities with positive externalities, such as charitable donations, private savings or investments in green technologies, are awarded tax credits. But when parents produce positive externalities, instead of receiving tax credits, they shoulder a significant extra resource contribution load. We calculate that the “tax” rates implicitly imposed thereby on child-rearing are much higher than the value-added tax rates in place in Europe on consumption goods such as food, clothes and electronics. Is this a good policy?

Most people today agree that there is something quite wrongheaded about two other widespread societal (non-)valuation practices. Claudia Goldin was awarded the 2023 Economics Nobel Prize for her research on gender and “motherhood penalties.” Nancy Folbre has shown persistent ”carer penalties.” Folbre put it memorably: when societies take prisoners of love, it does not benefit them in the long run. This is an unsustainable policy.

Toward more complete human capability-boosting policies

Better accounting for invisible value production by families substantially changes how we understand, let alone address, the same policy question. When parents contribute over two-and-a-half times more resources than non-parents, this captures the sheer magnitude of the hidden asymmetry in cost-sharing. The large size of the still-privatised cost of child-rearing will affect parenting decisions and will lower fertility levels. This raises important questions about current policy practices in “social investment Europe".

Across Europe, parents have consistently fewer children than they would like. In addition, European societies have long grappled with fertility rates well below replacement levels, high or still-increasing levels of childlessness, and larger, longer-living older populations. Yet despite these rising demographic tensions, societies unwittingly tax rather than subsidize their own reproduction. In the long run, this is an unsustainable policy.

To secure sustainable future foundations and avoid becoming a continent of gerontocracies, Europe needs to make its currently elderly-oriented welfare states more intergenerationally balanced and much more human capital-oriented. Notwithstanding its name, the “social investment paradigm” needs to design yet more extensive policy models to better assist, value and incentivize the work of parents, carers and educators – those who nurture the human capabilities that sustain our societies.

References

• Bonomi Bezzo, F., Raitano, M., Vanhuysse, P. (2023), ‘Beyond human capital: how does parents’ direct influence on their sons’ earnings vary across eight OECD countries?,’ Oxford Economic Papers https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpad007
• Gál R.I., Vanhuysse P. &- Vargha L. (2018), Pro-elderly welfare states within child-oriented societies. Journal of European Public Policy 25(6): 944–58.
• Vanhuysse P. & Gál R.I. (2023), ‘Intergenerational Resource Transfers in the Context of Welfare States,’ in: Daly M., Pfau-Effinger B., Gilbert N., Besharov D., editors. The Oxford Handbook of Family Policy: A Life-Course Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2023. p. 1015–33.
• Vanhuysse, P., Medgyesi, M. & Gal R.I (2023), Taxing reproduction: the full transfer cost of rearing children in Europe, Royal Society Open Science, https://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.230759
• Vanhuysse, P., Medgyesi, M. & Gál, R.I (2021), Welfare States as Lifecycle Redistribution Machines, PLOS ONE 16(8):e0255760 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255760

Generation Z

без умная Грета

McDonald’s в США в течение года будет тестировать новую концепцию ресторанов CosMc’s

Пилотный филиал открылся в штате Иллинойс, а к концу следующего года их будет около десяти в разных регионах. В меню — большой выбор ярких безалкогольных напитков, десертов и сэндвичей. Заказ доступен только с помощью «drive-in».

Эксперты считают, что новая концепция может создать сильную конкуренцию Starbucks, особенно среди молодежи.

👤 Джеффри Янг, глава аналитической компании Allegra World Coffee Portal, рассказал BBC: «Новая эра молодых потребителей хочет, чтобы все было весело, доступно и быстро обслуживалось: например, использование киосков, заказ по телефону или доставка через дорогу».

👤 Андреа Эрнандес, основатель фуд-платформы Snaxshot, говорит в комментарии для ВВС: «Starbucks был напитком миллениалов, но поколение Z — это контркультура, они ищут что-то другое». Основной целевой аудиторией, по мнению эксперта, будут люди, родившиеся в период с 1997 по 2012 год.

@BILD_Russian

Losing More Ground:

Revisiting Young Women’s Well-Being Across Generations

Despite decades of progress between the 1960s and 1990s, each generation of women in the United States does not do better than the generation before—not anymore. In fact, young women of the Millennial Generation have lost ground on key areas of health and safety since our original Index of Young Women’s Well-Being and 2017 report.

PRB’s Population Bulletin, “Losing More Ground: Revisiting Young Women’s Well-Being Across Generations,” presents an updated analysis on the well-being of women ages 25 to 34 to understand how this group has fared across the Silent Generation, the Baby Boom, Generation X, and the Millennial Generation. Where data are available, we include insights on the teenage girls of Gen Z.1

Our analysis shows improvement for Millennial women in some areas, such as increased education and earnings and decreased rates of women’s incarceration. But important measures of health and safety are headed in the wrong direction, including rates for maternal mortality, suicide, and homicide. This decline in well-being has in many ways intensified amidst rapid changes to the social and economic landscape brought on by factors such as the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Dobbs decision overturning reproductive health protections that had been in place since the Silent Generation.

READ FULL REPORT

Key Findings

• Climbing suicide rates. Among women ages 25 to 34, suicide rates have risen from 4.4 deaths per 100,000 for Generation X to 7 deaths per 100,000 for Millennial women. In recent years, suicide rates have declined among young white women, but they have increased for young women of color; American Indian and Alaska Native young women face a suicide rate 3 times that of their white peers.
• Surging maternal mortality. For Millennial women ages 25 to 34, maternal mortality rates have swelled, from 19.2 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2013-2015 to 30.4 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2019-2021.
• Rising homicide rates. Millennial women ages 25 to 34 have a homicide rate of 4.5 deaths per 100,000 women compared to 4.3 deaths for young women of Generation X, reversing a trend of generational improvement previously seen in 2017. The homicide rate is particularly stark for Millennial Black women, at 14 deaths per 100,000 women in 2019-2021 compared to 9 per 100,000 in 1999-2001—a nearly 60% increase.

These health and safety declines are occurring despite young women’s progress on several indicators of economic well-being and their labor force participation remaining steady or improving across generations.

• Higher education. Nearly 44% of Millennial young women are completing a college education with at least a bachelor’s degree. This share is up from 28% of Generation X young women. Gaps persist by race and ethnicity.
• Lower incarceration rate. Women’s incarceration rate has declined for the first time in more than 50 years, with just under 70 women in prison per 100,000 during the 2019-2021 period compared to 86 per 100,000 when Generation X women were young adults (1999-2001).
• Increased earnings. Millennial young women’s earnings as a percentage of men’s have increased compared to the wages of their Generation X peers, rising just over 7 cents, from 82.4 cents per dollar to 89.7 cents per dollar.

не так давно, про это писали

the largest generation

Крупнейшие поколения в странах Европы

На большей части территории Европы крупнейшее поколение - это бумеры (baby-boomers, поколение родившихся в послевоенные годы, здесь - с 1944 по 1964). Мы тут, кстати, не исключение. А ведь самым молодым из бумеров в следующем году исполняется 60! Земля стариков...

Поколение X лидирует в некоторых странах Восточной Европы, а ещё - в Великобритании, Ирландии и Бенилюксе. Миллениалы на первом месте в основном в бедных регионах Европы (включая Беларусь и Турцию), но есть одно исключение - Швеция!

[жаль год не указан: на когда ? = дожитие
+среднегодовую надо считать, поколения то разные

надо бы самому посчиать, данные, наверно есть]

generations

[Сравнивают].. нынешние споры о 1991 годе с (гипотетическими) разговорами в 1991 о событиях 1961. Понятно, что взгляд молодежи и взгляд людей, проживших эти тридцатилетние периоды в сознательном возрасте отличается. Но мне показалось важным отметить вот что:

Перестройка была во многом продолжением и завершением 1960-х, поколение "шестидесятников" получило, наконец, возможность завершить то, что начинало тогда, и что было прервано "на взлете". И Горбачев был "шестидесятником", и привлеченная им интеллигенция. То есть понять начало перестройки, надежды и чаяния ее "прорабов" и идеологов невозможно без понимания споров и конфликтов периода Хрущева и его отстранения. (Ну и не зря было тогда популярно определение 1989 года как "отсроченного 1968").

Однако в стране к 1985 (и тем более к 1991) году жили уже вполне взрослые и амбициозные поколения более молодых людей, для которых эти самые чаяния шестидесятников не были близки, чьи мысли и поступки формировались другой эпохой. Это были и будущие ельцинские реформаторы (та самая тридцатилетняя молодежь), и будущие могильщики свобод (те самые путинские гебисты). Окончание перестройки определялось уже не шестидесятниками, а этими новыми людьми (и его уже невозможно понять без анализа эпохи Брежнева).

Наверное, так будет и сейчас: начало постпутинской России может оказаться в руках тех, кто упустил шанс в 1990-е, и будет похоже на "восстановление" и "доведение до конца" задач реформаторов конца прошлого века, но очень скоро их оттеснит следующее поколение со своими задачами, своими представлениями о стране, идеалах и необходимых действиях. Те, для кого сегодня споры о ГКЧП похожи на разговор о смене Алексея Кириченко на Фрола Козлова.

такая интерпретация возможна, но не значит, что она верна

from poverty to middle class

Сколько поколений нужно в разных странах мира, чтобы из бедности подняться до среднего класса

Лучше всего с социальной мобильностью в странах Северной Европы: в Дании в среднем нужно 2 поколения, чтобы из нижних 10% по доходу подняться до среднего по стране дохода (то есть, уже внуки выходца из беднейших слоёв в среднем будут средним классом). В Финляндии, Норвегии и Швеции нужно 3 поколения, в среднем же по странам ОЭСР - 4.5 поколения

С обратной стороны рейтинга - Колумбия, с невозможными 11 поколениями, ЮАР и Бразилия с 9. В Индии и Китае с социальной мобильностью тоже всё очень плохо - чтобы подняться из бедного в средний класс, нужно 7 поколений (и кто-то после этого ещё считает Китай "коммунистической страной"), из развитых стран главные отстающие - Германия и Франция, по 6 поколений

интересный вопрос: на каких данных такие выводы?

cohort nuptiality

26 июня 2023 г. в очном формате состоится очередное заседание научного семинара Лаборатории экономики народонаселения и демографии.

С докладом по теме

"Рождаемость в брачных когортах и брачность в реальных поколениях: возможности оценки на основе ежегодной статистики"

выступит заведующий Сектором воспроизводства населения и демографической политики ЛЭНД, к.э.н. В.Н.Архангельский

Начало в 14 часов, аудитория 443.

Явка сотрудников ЛЭНД, не находящихся в отпуске, обязательна.

the largest

Крупнейшая возрастная когорта в разных странах мира

Самая крупная возрастная группа в России - это старшие миллениалы (1985-89 гг рождения) - и тут мы похожи, к примеру, на Китай, Австралию или Бразилию, а из стран Европы - только на Норвегию, в остальных доминируют старшие возрастные группы

Сильнее всего засилье "стариков" в Канаде, и ряде стран Европы (включая Германию): там крупнейшая когорта - это бэби-бумеры (1960-64 гг рождения)! Но в большинстве стран Европы всё же доминируют родившиеся в 1970-ых годах.

Молодёжь (совсем молодёжь - 2015-19 годов рождения) доминирует в Африке, некоторых странах Латинской Америки и Средней Азии (включая, кстати, вполне себе экономически развитый Казахстан!)

Social Isolation, Health Literacy, and Mortality Risk

Findings From the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing

Objective: To investigate the relationships between social isolation, health literacy, and all-cause mortality, and the modifying effect of social isolation on the latter relationship. 

Methods: Data were from 7731 adults aged 􏰀50 years participating in Wave 2 (2004/2005) of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing. Social isolation was defined according to marital/cohabiting status and contact with children, relatives, and friends, and participation in social organizations. Scores were split at the median to indicate social isolation (yes vs. no). Health literacy was assessed as comprehension of a medicine label and classified as “high” (􏰀75% correct) or “low” (􏰁75% correct). The outcome was all-cause mortality up to February 2013. Cox proportional hazards models were adjusted for sociodemographic factors, health status, health behaviors, and cognitive function. 

Results: Mortality rates were 30.3% versus 14.3% in the low versus high health literacy groups, and 23.5% versus 13.7% in the socially isolated versus nonisolated groups. Low health literacy (adj. HR 􏰂 1.22, 95% CI 1.02–1.45 vs. high) and social isolation (adj. HR 􏰂 1.28, 95% CI 1.10–1.50) were independently associated with increased mortality risk. The multiplicative interaction term for health literacy and social isolation was not statistically significant (p 􏰂 .81). 

Conclusions: Low health literacy and high social isolation are risk factors for mortality. Social isolation does not modify the relationship between health literacy and mortality. Clinicians should be aware of the health risks faced by socially isolated adults and those with low health literacy.

􏰂 — значит =, >, <, или больше/меньше и равно, по контексту понятно

Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/hea0000541.supp

Measuring and Analysing the Generational Economy

Департамент по экономическим и социальным вопросам Секретариата Организации Объединенных Наций выполняет функции жизненно важного передаточного звена, обеспечивающего преобразование глобальных стратегий в экономической, социальной и экологической сферах в конкретные действия на национальном уровне.

ссылка на оба врианта: англ и рус

Департамент работает в трех главных взаимосвязанных областях: i) он собирает, готовит и анализирует широкий круг экономических, социальных и экологических данных и информации, которые используются государствами - членами Организации Объединенных Наций при обсуждении общих проблем и рассмотрении альтернативных вариантов политики; ii) он способствует проведению государствами-членами на многих международных форумах переговоров по обсуждению совместных действий по решению существующих или возникающих глобальных проблем; и iii) он консультирует заинтересованные правительства относительно путей и средств выработки на основе рамочных стратегий, разработанных на конференциях и встречах на высшем уровне Организации Объединенных Наций, программ на страновом уровне и оказывает по линии технической помощи содействие в укреплении национального потенциала.

This manual is the result of numerous contributions by individuals and institutions, as noted in what follows. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, in partnership with the United Nations regional commissions for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and Western Asia (ESCWA), implemented the Development Account project ROA167, "Strengthening capacity of national policy analysts in the social and economic sectors of developing countries in the production and use of National Transfer Accounts", during 2011-2013. The project sponsored an Expert Group Meeting in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in December 2011, and two training workshops, one for ESCWA region countries in Amman, Jordan, in July 2012, and one interregional workshop in Bangkok, Thailand, in September 2012. At the same time, during this period, the preparation and revision of the material contained in the present manual was undertaken. This preface gives background information on the scientific and policy questions that led to the development of the NTA framework, the methods and applications, and that resulted in the production of the manual, acknowledging key contributions.

The Lifelines Cohort Study: A rich data source for demographers

by LLUÍS MANGOT-SALA & KATHARINA RUNGE 

27 juni 2022 | DEMOS jaargang 38, nummer 6 - juni 2022

Population-based cohort studies are important for causal analyses between demographic events and health-related outcomes. The University of Groningen has been building the Lifelines Cohort Study, which offers rich possibilities for cross-fertilization between demographers and biomedical researchers. A primer for the uninitiated.

The Lifelines Cohort Study is a large, prospective population-based cohort study and biobank, examining the biomedical, socio-demographic, behavioural, physical and psychological factors contributing to the health and disease of 167,729 individuals living in the three Northern provinces of the Netherlands. Between 2006 and 2013, eligible participants between 25 and 50 years of age were recruited through their general practitioner. They were also asked to indicate whether their family members (parents, partner, children, parents-in-law) would be willing to participate. Additionally, other interested individuals could self-register. This resulted in a three-generation cohort of 15,000 children (0-18 years), 140,000 adults (18-65 years), and 12,000 older adults (65+ years).

Lifelines offers numerous possibilities for demographic research: it contains rich sociodemographic information (e.g., partner status, employment status, educational attainment), as well as life-course events, such as moving house, starting (or ending) a relationship, having a child, or finding (or losing) a job. Furthermore, Lifelines is particularly strong in the assessment of health behaviours and outcomes: from alcohol consumption, dietary patterns, total- and domain-specific physical activity to biological markers, chronic diseases and even genetic information. Thus, a wide range of research questions on the association between life transitions and health (behaviours) can be answered using the Lifelines study.

Furthermore, Lifelines offers a very large sample, which contains almost 10% of the population of the three northern provinces of the Netherlands and has been shown to be broadly representative of the whole population. Moreover, it is an ongoing cohort study containing already five waves of observations – and a sixth one being gathered-, which allows a wide range of longitudinal analyses. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the “Lifelines COVID-19” sub-cohort (n=76,795) was developed, in order to assess the attitudes towards the lockdown regulations, and health (behaviours) of the observed population, with a total of 24 waves of data gathered between March 2020 and July 2021. Numerous studies focussing on the association between life events and health (behaviours) using Lifelines have been published recently. For instance, the association between unemployment trajectories and alcohol consumption patterns was studied. Further, it was investigated whether metabolic syndrome development – a risk factor for subsequent onset of type two diabetes mellitus and cardiovascular disease – differs by occupational groups or changes in employment status among older workers. In turn, the COVID sub-cohort was used to analyse the impact of the lockdown measures on alcohol consumption patterns. Last but not least, Lifelines data can be linked to external data sources, such as register data from Statistics Netherlands.

Generational overlap places a heavy burden on parents in the global South

January 17, 2022 Diego Alburez-Gutierrez Generational overlap has mainly been studied for populations in the global North, but it affects care time demands on parents worldwide. Indeed, demographic ‘sandwiching’ is more prevalent in the global South, although is expected to decline by one-third between 1970 and 2040. These trends have important policy implications, says Diego Alburez-Gutierrez.

 

Is population aging mainly a concern for countries in the global North?

Population aging is often framed as a problem mainly affecting countries in the global North, where fertility and mortality are low. The European Commission Green Paper on Ageing (EC, 2021) aimed at identifying policies to tackle all aspects of this phenomenon. The document points up the changing proportion of working-age individuals in the population, echoing the view that measures like dependency ratios capture the main implications of population aging for societies.

However, contemporary demographic changes affect populations beyond dependency ratios. The Green Paper on Ageing itself also identifies “solidarity and responsibility between generationsˮ as an essential component of future policies to address population aging. This relates to the demographic concept of generational overlap, the degree to which members of different generations are alive at the same time (Grundy and Henretta, 2006). Overlapping generations are a universal phenomenon, but, with a few exceptions (de Lima, Tomás and Queiroz, 2015; Urdinola and Tobar, 2019), the phenomenon has been studied mainly in the global North.

Global trends of generational sandwiching

The Sandwich Generation refers to a particular type of generational overlap. The concept is not uniformly defined in the literature, making it difficult to study in an international comparative perspective. In a recent paper (Alburez, Zagheni and Mason, 2021), we use a standard demographic definition of generational “sandwichingˮ to study the phenomenon worldwide. Building on existing work (de Lima, Tomás and Queiroz, 2015), we consider individuals to be sandwiched if they have at least one young child (aged 15 years or less) and a parent or parent in-law who is expected to die within 5 years. This is exemplified in Figure 1, where the red segment in Ego’s lifeline represents the sandwiching period. Similarly, we consider individuals to be “grand-sandwichedˮ if they simultaneously have at least one young grandchild and a parent or parent-in-law who is expected to die within 5 years.
Armed with this definition, we estimated the prevalence of demographic (grand)sandwiching using a large number of demographic microsimulations based on demographic data from the United Nations’ 2019 revision of World Population Prospects. The simulated microdata allowed us to identify and quantify the periods in which parents around the world find themselves sandwiched between generations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first overview of the degree to which parents face simultaneous care-time demands from multiple generations around the world.

Perhaps the main finding is that the Sandwich Generation is less prevalent in the global North than in the global South, where parents are also more likely to spend longer periods in this state ‒ a surprising finding given that the life expectancy of parents is lower in the global South than in the North. Figure 2 exemplifies these trends by showing the number of years that a person born in 1970 can expect to spend (grand)sandwiched.
The study also provides novel evidence on the incidence of demographic sandwiching over the life course. Figure 3 shows the ages at which care-time demands are expected to peak in different regions, a period that Zannella et al. have called the “rush hour of lifeˮ (2019). The burden of generational (grand)sandwiching throughout their lives is greatest for individuals born in Sub-Saharan Africa and smallest for those born in Europe and North America. This contradicts the received wisdom that parents in the global North face the largest burden of sandwiching as a result of more widespread population aging.

Implications of generational sandwiching

A continued focus on the generally wealthy countries of the global North has limited our understanding of the demographic dynamics that drive generational overlap on a planetary scale. Global studies allow us to situate phenomena in a comparative perspective. The finding that parents in the South face a heavier burden of sandwiching is especially relevant when we consider that they often also lack access to adequate systems of old-age support (such as pensions) and institutional childcare.

These trends have implications for the future of our societies. In our study, we project that people will face fewer demands to provide informal care to family members in the future. This may be a welcome development for over-burdened parents. At the same time, increased availability of grandparents can help to ease time constraints for parents in low- and middle-income countries. Generational overlap does not need to be a burden on individuals and families.

References

• Alburez‐Gutierrez, D., Mason, C., and Zagheni, E. (2021). The “Sandwich Generation” Revisited: Global Demographic Drivers of Care Time Demands. Population and Development Review. Avanced publication.
• Grundy, E. and Henretta, J.C. (2006). Between elderly parents and adult children: a new look at the intergenerational care provided by the ‘sandwich generation’. Ageing and Society 26(5):707–722.
• de Lima, E.E.C., Tomás, M.C., and Queiroz, B.L. (2015). The sandwich generation in Brazil: demographic determinants and implications. Revista Latinoamericana de Población 9(16):59–73.
• Urdinola, B. Piedad, and Jorge A. Tovar, eds. 2019. Time Use and Transfers in the Americas: Producing, Consuming, and Sharing Time Across Generations and Genders. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
• Zannella, M., Hammer, B., Prskawetz, A., and Sambt, J. (2019). A Quantitative Assessment of the Rush Hour of Life in Austria, Italy and Slovenia. European Journal of Population 35(4):751–776.
• EC (2021). Green Paper on Ageing. European Commission.

lonely mental health

Longitudinal analyses indicate bidirectional associations between #loneliness and #Health @Liz__Munoz https://t.co/qKB7z3OamK

— Aging & Mental Health (@AgingMH) June 21, 2022

generation war

Журналист Максим Трудолюбов посмотрел на войну как на конфликт поколений.

Это не только война двух совершенно разных армий и двух разных обществ, но и война поколений. С российской стороны войну начали и ведут приближающиеся к 70-летию или перевалившие на другую сторону Путин (1952 г.р), Патрушев (1951 г.р.), Шойгу (55), Герасимов (55), Лавров (50), Бортников (51), Нарышкин (54), Золотов (54), Матвиенко (49), юные Колокольцев (61), Медведев (65) и Мишустин (66).

Обороняют Украину Зеленский (1978 г.р.), главнокомандующий ВСУ Залужный (1973 г.р.), министр обороны Резников (66 – редкий человек 60-х годов рождения), глава СБУ Баканов (75), глава МИД Кулеба (81) глава МВД Монастырский (80), прокурор Венедиктова (78), ключевые чиновники президентского офиса Ермак (71), Подоляк (72), Арестович (75). Премьер Шмыгаль – 75 года рождения.

В правительстве Украины люди 80-х годов рождения занимают системные должности – вице-премьеры Юлия Свириденко (85) и Ольга Стефанишина (85), названный выше глава МВД, министр инфраструктуры Кубраков (82), министр здравоохранения Ляшко (80), министр финансов Марченко (81), министр юстиции Малюська (81). Вице-премьер и министр цифровой трансформации Михаил Федоров родился в 1991 г.

Люди, принимающие ключевые решения в Украине, если и помнят СССР, то по детству и школе, а так в общем и не помнят. Но это, пожалуй, не главное. Опыт работы на государство у многих из них недолгий, есть бывшие депутаты, профессионалы, в том числе менеджеры и юристы. Им знакома культура стартапа, они понимают, как устроен современный мир, они знают иностранные языки. Это вообще совсем другие люди, чем те, что захватили власть в РФ.

Я не всех посмотрел, но можно без натяжки сказать, что перед нами – два поколения.

И речь тут не только об украинцах. Обезумевшие от крови пожилые чекисты пытаются уничтожить не только новое поколение украинской элиты, но и то поколение, которое могло и должно было прийти им на смену в России. Если с первой задачей они скорее всего не справятся, то со второй – уже справились.

Те представители российского поколения 70-х и 80-х годов рождения, которые – ровно как их украинские ровесники – могли бы сейчас принимать ключевые решения в стране, находятся нигде. Они либо работают в услужении у начальства, либо ушли во внутреннюю или внешнюю эмиграцию. Многие, вероятно, реализуют себя, но есть и те, кто чувствуют, что могли бы сделать что-то для страны, но видимо так и будут это чувствовать до конца дней.

Это война 70-летних против 40- и 30-летних, война поколений, которой в принципе не должно было быть. Да, процесс перехода мог быть трудным – я представлял, что он будет трудным и писал об этом. Это было неизбежно в стране, в которой все плохо с передачей власти и собственности. Но я не думал, что будет так. Вцепившиеся мертвой хваткой во власть обреченные – не безобидны. На их совести гибель тысяч людей и не имеющие оправданий военные преступления. Это хуже всего. Но они уничтожили – не физически – и тех, кто мог бы вывести Россию из раскопанной ими ямы. Уничтожили их репутации, поставив себе на службу или лишили их возможностей, выдавив из страны.

Даже если война закончится в этом году и волшебным образом «дети» сменят «отцов», то – что это будут за дети? Младшие Патрушев и Кириенко? Если смена будет все-таки не от Патрушева к Патрушеву, то и тут будут проблемы. Те, кто оставался в России будут с недоверием относиться к тем, кто был в эмиграции. И это чувство будет взаимным. Впрочем, и так уже длинно.

Changing attitudes may explain the decline in US birth rates since 2007

March 21, 2022 by Melissa S. Kearney and Phillip B. Levine

The US birth rate has fallen since the 2007 Great Recession, with no signs of reversing. This decline has occurred among women of different age subgroups, education levels, races, and ethnicities, and it cannot be explained by demographic, economic, or policy changes. A possible reason, Melissa Kearney and Phillip Levine argue, is changing attitudes about having children in the U.S.

For the roughly two and a half decades between 1980 and 2007, the US birth rate hovered around 65-70 births per 1,000 women aged 15-44. It followed a predictable pro-cyclical pattern, falling during economic downturns and recovering when the situation improved (Dettling and Kearney 2014; Schaller 2016; Kearney and Levine 2020). But something changed around the time of the Great Recession, as shown in Figure 1. The US birth rate fell precipitously with the economic downturn of 2007-2009 and it did not recover when the economy revived. Rather, it continued a steady descent, falling by almost 20 percent between 2007 and 2020 to 55.8 births per 1,000 women.

The decline in births cannot readily be explained by contemporaneous demographic, economic, or policy factors

The sustained decline in US births since 2007 is driven more by a decline in initial childbearing (first births) than by higher-order births, consistent with an increase in rates of childlessness. It has occurred among both married and unmarried women in their early 20s, late 20s, and teens (in fact, the teen birth rate in the U.S. has been falling steadily since the mid-1990s), among White, Black, Hispanic and non-Hispanic women (with the largest decrease observed among Hispanic women), and among women with and without college degrees.

Various explanations have been put forward in speculative news articles and opinion pieces for this sustained decline in US births over the past decade and a half, including the high cost of childcare, the high level of student debt carried by young adults, or the improved occupational opportunities for women. However, the widespread nature of the decline makes it unlikely that any single explanation will have substantial explanatory power. Furthermore, the sharp downturn around 2007 suggests that the overall decline does not primarily reflect a single contemporaneous factor; other than the Great Recession, there was no major change in US policy around that time. For instance, student debt may be affecting the childbearing plans of some small groups of women, but it cannot explain why women both at the top and bottom of the education distribution are having fewer children. Nor did the extent or nature of student debt in the U.S. change sharply around 2007.

In a recent paper (Kearney, Levine, Pardue, forthcoming), we show that neither changes in demographic composition nor changes in economic or policy factors can account for the sustained decline in US birth rates since the Great Recession. In terms of demographics, the population of US women of childbearing age has shifted toward groups that tend to have higher birth rates. In terms of state level economic and policy factors, none of the measures shown in previous research to have a causal effect on annual birth rates – such as labor market conditions, social policy indicators, or reproductive health policy measures – have changed since 2007 in ways that could statistically account for the sustained decline. We also find no evidence of a cross-sectional relationship between state level variations in birth rates and changes in women’s relative earnings, take-up rates of long-acting reversible contraception (LARC), or childcare and home rental prices over this time. The relevant data offer little to no evidence that economic and policy factors besides the Great Recession are responsible for the large, sustained decline in the US birth rate since 2007.

Shifting priorities?

A more plausible explanation is that the attitudes and priorities of the generation of adults who entered their early 20s in the early 2000s and later are different from those of earlier generations (Kearney, Levine, Pardue, forthcoming).

A cohort-based explanation better fits the empirical patterns observed in the data. Cohorts of US women born after the mid-1980s are having fewer births at all ages. Figure 2 shows that the three cohorts that entered their young adult years in 1992, 1997, and 2002 (born between 1968 and 1982), all had similar childbearing age profiles. Then, the cohort of women who entered young adulthood in 2007 (the 1983-87 birth cohort) had fewer children throughout their 20s and 30s, as did the next two cohorts – those who entered their prime childbearing years in 2012 and 2017 (born between 1988 and 1997). In other words, later cohorts of mothers have fewer children at every age than women in earlier cohorts.
These cohort patterns give rise to the speculative hypothesis that shifting priorities may be the primary driver of the birth rate decline since 2007. Perhaps more recent cohorts of young adults have different childbearing preferences, aspirations for life, and views about parenting norms. (Such an explanation might apply to similar declines observed in other high-income countries over recent decades.) These shifts could reflect preferences and norms that changed primarily in earlier decades, long before 2007 – such as more intensive parenting practices and expanding economic opportunities for women – in ways that profoundly shaped the world views of today’s younger adults.

If the decline in births reflects a (semi)permanent shift in priorities, as opposed to transitory economic or policy factors, the U.S. is likely to see falling birth rates and a general decline in fertility for the foreseeable future. This has consequences for projected US economic growth and productivity, and for the fiscal sustainability of current social insurance programs.

References

• Dettling, Lisa and Melisa S. Kearney. “House Prices and Birth Rates: The Impact of the Real Estate Market on the Decision to Have a Baby,” Journal of Public Economics 110, February 2014: 1-166
• Kearney, Melissa S. and Phillip B. Levine. 2020. “Half a Million Fewer Children? The Coming Covid Baby Bust.” Brookings Institution.
• Kearney, Melissa S., Phillip B. Levine, Luke Pardue, forthcoming. The Puzzle of Falling US Birth Rates Since the Great Recession, Journal of Economic Perspectives.Schaller, Jessamyn. 2016.”Booms, busts, and fertility testing the becker model using gender-specific labor demand.” Journal of Human Resources 51, no. 1: 1-29.

a generation

Если с точки зрения демографии, люди с разницей в возрасте пять–семь лет могут быть отнесены к одному поколению, то в фокусе когортного подхода это совсем не обязательно, поскольку важнее возраста оказываются общие ценности и ощущение совместной социально-исторической судьбы одного поколения. Такая когортная, или социологическая, матрица особенно плодотворна при изучении поколения в турбулентные периоды развития общества (революции, распад государства, экономические кризисы, войны), когда при небольшой разнице в возрасте люди, формально-демографически принадлежащие к одному поколению, оказываются в кардинально различающихся социальных ситуациях, стремительно приобретают принципиально иной опыт, дифференцирующий их от других современников, и с социологической точки зрения могут принадлежать к совершенно разным поколенческим когортам.

С одной стороны, поколение, с другой — какбенет. Не сказать, чтоб очень понятно, но путинское поколение, родившееся в 90х теперь объединено войной с Украиной, а то никак не могли ему лэйбак придумать :(

По демографическому определению так называют совокупность людей, у которых в один и тот же период времени произошло определённое демографическое событие (рождение, вступление в брак, рождение ребёнка, иное) [ссылка на вики]

Это самое начало, мб, дальше лучше будет. 

BelGGS

Уважаемые коллеги,

приглашаем вас принять участие в научном семинаре Института демографии им. А.Г. Вишневского

«Демографические вызовы XXI века»,

который состоится 22 октября 2021 года.

С докладом на тему

«Поколения и гендер в Беларуси (BelGGS): Подготовка 2-го этапа»

выступит Ольга Викентовна Терещенко,
профессор кафедры социальной коммуникации Белорусского Государственного Университета.

C 2016 г. Беларусь принимает активное участие в международной исследовательской программе Gender Generation Program, включающей три демографических исследования.

В 2017 гг. в Беларуси было проведено первое из трех исследований, в подготовке которого нас активно консультировали С.В. Захаров и другие коллеги из Института демографии, а финансировало Правительство Российской Федерации.

Национальная выборка численностью 10 000 человек была опрошена по анкете, включавшей более 700 вопросов. По результатам исследования был выпущен двухтомный научный отчет, в подготовке которого приняли участие более 30 человек, а также другие многочисленные публикации.

Второе исследование планировалось на 2020 г., но было отложено из-за проблем, связанных с Covid-19. В текущем году было принято решение о проведении второго опроса в 2022 г. Его подготовка уже началась, но оказалась существенно сложнее, чем была на предыдущем этапе. Её обсуждение может оказаться интересным и полезным для тех, кто участвует в аналогичных программах и исследованиях.

Начало семинара в 15:00.
Семинар состоится по адресу: ул. Мясницкая, 11, ауд. 330.
Рабочий язык: русский.
Всех, кто планирует принять участие в семинаре, просим подтвердить участие до 12:00 21 октября, заполнив форму

или по e-mail:  Валерий Юмагузин.



Будем рады встрече!

Strengthening intergenerational connections

The pandemic has highlighted the need for stronger intergenerational connections. Restarting intergenerational programs and expanding newer initiatives to connect people of different ages must be prioritized in debates about how society should progress post-pandemic.

Даже не знал, что есть термин такой #age_segregation, век жыви — век учись, дураком помрёшь.